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ABSTRACT 
Over the past decade, DoD surveys have shown a significant decrease in drug 
abuse within the Navy. This research considers the important elements of this 
reduction and conducts a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the Navy's drug 
abuse prevention programs. The primary question asks, "What is the most 
effective and efficient method to prevent drug abuse in the Navy?" The analysis 
reveals that drug testing and a strict "zero tolerance" policy have been key 
ingredients to the success of the Navy's drug abuse reductions. ~ersonal 
Responsibility Values Education and Training (PREVENT) is the Navy's only 
formal (Level I) drug abuse prevention program. Using direct observational 
techniques, the author provides personal insights into the PREVENT program. 
PREVENT's cognitive/lifestyle prevention approach is the most effective model 
for preventing drug abuse. PREVENT is also effective at reducing other high-
risk, addictive behaviors in junior enlisted personnel. Recommended efficiencies 
include consolidating the resource sponsor, major claimant, and program manager 
functions for drug abuse prevention training. Manpower effectiveness ·and 
. . 
efficiency recommendations are discussed, including establishing a career path for 
training specialists to coordinate and direct the Navy Alcohol and other Drug 
Abuse Program (NADAP) at the command level. 
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The Navy's internal "war on drugs" began in December 1981 when 
Admiral Hayward, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), explicitly 
acknowledged the Navy had a drug problem. Drug abuse was rampant within 
certain segments of the service. The Admiral based his conclusions on a 
Department of Defense (DoD) self-reporting survey showing 4 7 percent of the 
junior enlisted personnel had used marijuana during the previous 30 days. The 
Admiral outlined a tough new policy toward drug abuse in a service wide 
videotape presentation which was shown to every individual in the Navy. 
During the presentation, Admiral Hayward's fervent remarks epitomized the 
Navy's reversal of "indifference and passivity" toward drug abuse: 
We're going after this drug abuse problem in a multi-faceted 
way ... In other words, we're putting on a full-court press to 
generate as much deterrence, as much dis-incentive to our 
shipmates using drugs as we know how ... {We will accept} one 
simple set of standards: ... not on my watch ... not on my ship ... not 
in my Navy. (Hayward, 1981) 
Over a decade has passed and drug abuse within the Navy is at an all 
time low. The most recent worldwide survey of substance abuse among 
military personnel shows the Navy's overall abuse rate at about four percent, 
well below the civilian sector's ten percent rate (Bray et al., 1992). But the 
reduction has cost the Navy a tremendous amount in resources, both in 
monetary and personnel terms. In _FY -93 alone the Navy spent more than 27 
million dollars in drug demand reduction endeavors while testing over· 1.8 
mitlion urine samples. The "zero tolerance" policy now includes all Navy 
personnel (E-1 and above),· with mandatory separation for a single abuse 
incident. Additionally, every command in the Navy has an assigned Drug and 
Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA) who is responsible to the commanding officer 
for implementing the Navy's Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program. 
With the reductions in illegal drug use over the past decade, the 
Department of Defense (DoD) and the Navy have significantly cut drug 
prevention dollars. When considering the time and resources expended in 
preventing drug abuse and the downturn in prevention funding, the question 
must be asked, "are we utilizing our resources properly to maximize our 
effectiveness and efficiency in fighting drug abuse?" The Navy has adopted 
the Deming concept of Total Quality Management (TOM), which stresses the 
importance of continual process improvement. A critical part of improving 
quality is to evaluate both effectiveness and efficiency. Through qualitative 
and quantitative analysis, this thesis will attempt to address these critical 
elements of quality as they relate to the Navy's drug abuse prevention 
programs. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this study is to consider what is the most effective and 
efficient method to prevent drug abuse in the Navy. Both qualitative and 
quantitative techniques will be used to analyze key aspects of the Navy's drug 
abuse prevention programs. 
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The primary research question is: What is the most effective and 
efficient method to prevent drug abuse in the Navy? Subsidiary questions 
include: 
• Is drug testing an effective method for preventing drug abuse? 
• What is the best model for preventing drug abuse? 
• Does the Navy efficiently utilize its resources in fighting drug abuse? 
2 
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Scope 
This thesis will focus on the demand reduction side of illegal drug abuse. 
Supply reduction (i.e., drug interdiction) is beyond the scope of this study. It 
is discussed only for historical background and briefly mentioned during some 
limited resource allocation analysis. 
2. Limitations 
The primary limitation to this study is the lack of reliable Benefit-Cost 
Analysis (BCA) on drug prevention and abuse. Because drug use is illegal and 
it is difficult to quantify prevention benefits and indirect costs, the research 
failed to reveal any in-depth studies which accurately perform a true BCA of 
drug abuse in the Navy. 
3. Assumptions 
This study assumes the Navy's current policy of "zero tolerance" will 
remain in effect and is not subject to change. Additionally, this thesis assumes 
the rationale behind the zero tolerance policy (as explained in the Navy's 
Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Instruction) is an accurate 
portrayal regarding the negative affects of drug abuse. The instruction states: 
... drug abuse is a severe detriment to morale and esprit de corps. 
It undermines the very fiber of combat readiness, health, safety, 
discipline, reliability, judgment and loyalty ... drug abuse is 
incompatible with the maintenance of high standards of 
performance, military discipline and readiness and is destructive 
of Navy efforts to instill pride, promote professionalism, and 
enhance personal excellence. (OPNAVINST 5350.4B) 
3 
E. OLGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This chapter has introduced the reader to the general topic of "Drug 
Abuse Prevention in the Navy." Chapter II will address the methodology used 
to collect and analyze the data. Chapter Ill will present a historical background 
of drug abuse polices and programs. Chapters IV and V analyze the 
effectiveness and efficiency of drug abuse prevention programs. Chapter VI 
will render conclusions and recommendations. 
F. DEFINITIONS 
When required, definitions are provided in the text of this study. 
However, several important terms used throughout the thesis are highlighted 
below: 
• Blind Quality Control Sample: Urine samples which may be fortified 
with drug or metabolite; their identity is unknown to the drug testing 
laboratory. Blind quality control samples are randomly intermixed with 
patient samples. 
• Cutoff: The administratively defined urine concentration of drug or 
metabolite which determines the presence or absence of a specific 
drug. 
• Drug Abuse: The use of an illegal drug (or a legal drug which is used 
for other than its intended purpose).1 
• False Negative: Failure to report a drug or metabolite that is present 
above the cutoff. 
• False Positive: Report of a drug or metabolite that is not present 
above the cutoff. 
1 Many professionals also include alcohol when discussing drug abuse. This thesis does not focus on alcohol 
abuse. For brevity, the term "drug abuse" will be considered as synonymous with "illegal drug abuse." 
4 
• Gaming: The strategy used by a drug abuser to avoid detection of 
drug use (e.g., using inside knowledge of when a random drug test is 
scheduled to be conducted or flushing the body system with 
inordinate amounts of liquid). 




A. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
In his book entitled, Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods, Panon 
( 1 990) describes three methods for conducting qualitative analysis. These 
include: 
( 1) Direct Observation 
(2) Interviewing 
(3) Document Analysis 
Each method has its own limitations and weaknesses. For example, direct 
observation suffers from focusing on external behaviors and is limited by the 
amount of data available from relatively few observations. Interviewing is 
restricted to the perceptions and perspectives of the persons being interviewed; 
furthermore, interview data is subject to recall error and interviewer bias. 
Document analysis also contains several weaknesses which are discussed later. 
Using a combination of all three data gathering techniques increases the validity 
of the information and compensates for the weaknesses inherent in each 
individual method. 
Panon ( 1990) also contends that qualitative analysis permits the 
researcher to look at a particular issue in greater depth and detail without being 
constrained by prearranged categories of analysis. In contrast, quantitative 
analysis requires using standardized measures so varying perspectives and 
experiences can be grouped in predetermined categories. In quantitative 
analysis, careful anention to the data measuring instrument is critical. 
Unfortunately, all too often the focus becomes the measuring tool itself. 
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An interesting characteristic of qualitative analysis is the way in which 
the researcher becomes one of the measuring "instruments." This may create 
additional risk of bias and variation 1 but Guba and Lincoln ( 1 981) make the 
following argument in their book on effective evaluation . 
. . . this loss in rigor is more than offset by the flexibility 1 insight, 
and ability to build on tacit knowledge that is the peculiar province 
of the human instrument. (Guba & Lincoln, 1981) 
1 . Observational Evaluation 
Observational evaluation contains both direct participant and non-
participant qualities; this study utilizes both methods. Direct observational 
participation involved attending the Navy's only formal (Level I) drug abuse 
prevention program entitled, "Personal Responsibility and Values: Education and 
Training (PREVENT)." Indirect participation is derived from the interviews and 
document analysis sections of the research. 
Direct observational analysis may be the best form of research to fully 
comprehend the complexities of some issues. Howard Becker (a social science 
researcher) is one of the leading practitioners of the qualitative research 
methodology. He suggests that "participant observation is the most 
comprehensive of all types of research strategies." He makes the following 
point: 
The most complete form of the sociological datum, after all, is the 
form in which the participant observer gathers it: an observation 
of some social event, the events which precede and follow it, and 
explanations of its meaning by participants and spectators, before, 
during, and after its occurrence. Such a datum gives us more 
information about the event under study than data gathered by 
any other sociological method. (Becker & Geer, 1970). 
Patton ( 1990) adds that participant observation permits the researcher to 
understand and appreciate a particular program with greater depth. 
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2. Interviewing 
In the qualitative research methodology, "fieldwork" refers to the 
evaluation technique used when the researcher is on-site (i.e., physically 
present). A number of interviews have been conducted both "in the field" and 
over the phone. These interviews provide valuable data on the Navy's drug 
abuse programs. They enhance the written documentation by giving personal 
emphasis to areas which might otherwise be neglected. Another positive 
aspect of interviewing is the benefit gained through the experience and 
specialized knowledge of others. 
To maximize the efficiency and accuracy of the interview, this thesis 
uses several strategies suggested by Hunt (1993) and Patton (1990). The 
strategies include: 
• Establish an interview time/place in advance. 
• Develop open-ended questions and send them in advance of the 
interview to the interviewee. 
• Tape record the interview. 
• Review and interpret the information gained from the interview 
through transcribed notes. 
On-site interviews were conducted in Washington D.C. and San Diego, CA at 
the following offices: 
• · (OSD) Department of Defense Drug Enforcement Policy & Support 
(USDP/DEP&S-DR) 
• The Secretary of the Navy (SECNA V) Drug Demand Reduction Task 
Force (DDRTF) 
• Bureau of Naval Personnel (SUPERS): Navy Drug & Alcohol Program 
(Pers 63). {Training and Detection & Deterrence Branches} 
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• DCNO (Plans, Policy, & Operations) Counterdrug Branch (N-515) 
• U.S. Air Force (USAF) Drug Demand Reduction Office (AF/DPCH) 
• PREVENT Office, 32nd Street Naval Station, San Diego, CA 
• Navy Personal Research and Development Center (NPRDC), 
San Diego, CA 
Many follow-on interviews were conducted by phone with personnel from other 
offices. When required, these interviews are referenced in the thesis text. 
3. Document Analysis 
Document analysis serves to gather pertinent information and to validate 
the information gathered from the previously mentioned methods of qualitative 
research (observational and interviewing). The amount of data available on 
drug abuse prevention is staggering. A major source of information is the U.S. 
Government. The Anti-Drug Abuse act of 1 988 requires the President to 
develop and annually submit to Congress a National Drug Control Strategy. 
The Office of National Drug Control Policy was created to assist the President 
in this endeavor. Additionally, the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) 
maintains a massive clearing house with recent studies, reports and 
publications specifically dealing with drug abuse and prevention. 
There are several "on line" forums available through computer modem 
which contain drug prevention resources. An example is the Teachers 
Information Network (TIN). TIN provides a "Substance Abuse Forum" to allow 
academic professionals a medium to share information on drug abuse 
prevention. 
Many governmental agencies receive drug demand reduction funds and 
each has programs dealing with drug abuse prevention. For example, the 
"Southwest Regional Center for Drug-Free Schools and Communities" maintains 
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the "Substance Abuse Forum" (previously mentioned) as part of a grant with 
the Department of Education. Additionally, studies and research dealing with 
drug abuse and prevention are available from many universities and other 
professional organizations (both profit and non-profit). Another informative 
source is the U.S. Congress. Select committee hearings on drug abuse are 
routinely conducted, providing a wealth of background and policy review. 
Using many of these resources, this thesis used an informal archival 
research methodology to obtain a large quantity of condensed factual 
information. As noted in previous thesis research (lewis, 1993) there are some 
problems associated with this type of informal secondary archival research. 
Quoting from Research Methodology & Business Decisions (Buckley, 1976), 
some of these pitfalls include: 
• Selective depositing 
• Selective survival 
• Selective retrieval 
• "Filling in the gaps" 
• Biases inherent in the researcher 
• Skill-deficiencies of the researcher 
Even with these potential drawbacks, secondary archival research carries the 
advantage of allowing the researcher to acquire and analyze a significant 
amount of condensed information. 
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B. 1992 WORLDWIDE SURVEY 
The "Worldwide Survey of Substance Abuse and Health Behaviors 
Among Military Personnel" provides the most informative research available into 
the actions, beliefs, and attitudes of military personnel. The 1 992 survey is the 
fifth study conducted since 1980. Sponsored by DoD, the 1992 survey 
provides comprehensive estimates of drug and alcohol abuse along with other 
health-related, high risk factors (e.g., tobacco use, AIDS transmission, 
gambling, and nutrition). 
1 . Survey Methodology 
The 1992 Worldwide survey contains a sample size similar to the 
dimensions of previous surveys (e.g., approximately 25,000 service members 
from 63 geographic sites worldwide). As outlined in a recent phone interview 
between Bray and Hildebrandt ( 1994), the 1992 Survey uses a deeply 
stratified, two-stage, two phase cluster sample design with the estimates 
corresponding closely to the actual DoD population characteristics (concerning 
sex, race/ethnicity, education, age, marital status, and pay grade). The eligible 
survey population included all active-duty military personnel except: recruits; 
Service academy students; those who were absent without leave (AWOL); and 
persons in transit on a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) transfer. The 
overall response rate was 77.3 percent (which equated to 16,395 military 
personnel). Of particular note is the method in which the team members 
explained the purpose of the survey to the respondents. Personnel were 
encouraged to cooperate and provide honest answers while being given full 
assurances of anonymity. 
The analytical approach employed in the Worldwide survey uses 
descriptive tabulations and multivariate regression analyses of the survey data. 
Standardization techniques are also used to statistically adjust for the 
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demographic characteristics of the personnel taking the survey. These 
characteristics are adjusted for personnel across the previous Worldwide 
Surveys, the military Services and the civilian populations. Adjusted rates allow 
for comparison between survey years and the different Services. Regression-
based standardization techniques are used to adjust each Service's 
sociodemographic make-up. This procedure allows the construction of 
prevalence rates that would be expected if each military Service had the same 
sex, age, education, race/ethnicity, and marital status distribution. This thesis 
uses the adjusted figures throughout the analysis unless otherwise noted. 
The following list contains the nine objectives summarized in the 1992 
Survey: 
( 1) Assess the prevalence of substance use (alcohol, illicit drugs, 
tobacco, and nonmedical use of psychotherapeutic drugs) during 
the previous 30 days and 1 2 months. 
(2) Assess negative effects of alcohol and other drug use. 
(3) Identify the demographic and behavioral 
characteristics of substance users. 
(4) Examine trends in substance use. 
(5) Assess health practices, behaviors, and attitudes. 
(6) Examine reasons for substance use and nonuse. 
(7) Determine the prevalence of problem gambling among 
Service members. 
(8) Estimate selected medical costs of heavy smoking and 
heavy drinking among active-duty personnel. · 
(9) Compare military and civilian rates of substance use and 
knowledge about AIDS. 
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C. THE 1991 NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON DRUG ABUSE (NHSDA) 
The 1991 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA) is the 
eleventh study in a series of nationwide surveys designed to measure the 
prevalence of drug use among American households. The first two studies 
were conducted in 1971 and 1972 under the direction of the National 
Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse. NIDA sponsored the NHSDA From 
1974 to 1991. Beginning in October 1992, the NHSDA responsibility was 
moved to Office of Applied Studies (OAS) within the newly created Substance 
Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). Normally, three 
key reports are published after each annual survey: 
• Preliminary Estimates via Advance Reports 
• Population Estimates report providing demographic statistics 
• Main Findings report which complements and expands the scope of 
the Population Estimates report 
The statistical analysis conducted in this thesis uses the 1991 NHSDA 
results because this is the most recent survey completed which published all 
three of the reports listed above. The 1992 Main Findings report was never 
published after the 1992 survey and the most current report from the 1993 
survey is the Preliminary Estimates publication (Population Estimates and Main 
Findings for the 1993 survey are expected out in late 1994 and 1995 
respectively). Information from the 1992 and 1993 NHSDA's is used however 
to update the thesis analysis when appropriate. 
1 . Survey Methodology 
The 1 991 survey uses the same methodology which previous studies 
employed. It contains 32,594 observations in four age groups ranging from 12 
to 35 +. The sample design is a multi-stage, probability sample which meets 
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certain precision constraints for subgroups defined by age and minority 
membership. The sample excludes those persons who lived in group quarters 
or institutions (e.g., college dormitories, military bases, jails, and hospitals). 
Transient populations such as the homeless are also excluded. 
Sampling weights are used in the 1 991 survey to compensate for 
nonresponse and undercoverage. They also are used to reflect selection 
probabilities. A post-stratification adjustment forced respondent weight totals 
to mirror population totals for major characteristics (e.g., age, sex, and 
race/ethnicity). 
2. Limitations of the NHSDA 
Several shortcomings of the NHSDA have been noted. Specifically, the 
survey omits frequent absentees who may have a particular propensity for drug 
abuse (e.g., homeless people and jail occupants). Additionally, the 18 percent 
non response rate creates the possibility of nonresponse bias. However, the 
RAND Corporation supports the NHSDA survey. In a recent study in which 
RAND models the demand for cocaine (Everingham & Rydell, 1994) the NHSDA 
is supported as the best data available since no other measurements are 
sufficiently consistent over time. 
0. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Quantitative analysis uses standardized measures to correlate varying 
perspectives and experiences. These correlations are used to group responses 
into limited, predetermined categories so that quantitative (i.e., numerical) 
figures can be assigned. A significant advantage to quantitative analysis is that 
many responses can be manipulated to a specific number of questions, thereby 
facilitating comparisons and statistical relationships. Quantitative research 
requires careful instrument construction to ensure validity of the results. 
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Most of the quantitative analysis used in this thesis is the result of 
research conducted by other groups or individuals. This study benefits from 
the conclusions of these quantitative research efforts by incorporating their 
findings as supporting evidence to the qualitative analysis. Key to this portion 
of the thesis are the quantitative results derived from a Drug Abuse Research 
Group (DARG) formed in June 1994 at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
1. The Drug Abuse Research Group (DARG) 
The DARG was created within the purview of a research grant sponsored 
by The Bureau of Naval Personnel, Drug and Alcohol Program Division 
(Pers-63E). Primary members of the DARG included: 
Mr. Daniel Contreras, Amherst College, (Student) 
Dr. William Gates, NPS Visiting Professor 
Dr. Gregory Hildebrandt, NPS Visiting Professor 
Ms. Jennifer Hildebrandt, Pomona College (Graduate) 
Mr. Samuel Munger, Amherst College, (Student) 
LCDR D. Mark Peterson, NPS Student 
Dr. Katsuaki Terasawa, NPS Visiting Professor 
Ms. Miki Terasawa, Princeton College (Student) 
2. Statistical Analysis 
A comprehensive statistical evaluation of the 1992 Worldwide Survey 
and the 1991 NHSDA was conducted by Ms. Jennifer Hildebrandt using Legit 
analysis. 2 DoD Drug use estimation models (including recursive models) were 
used to establish relationships between specific variable~ and the probability of 
2For further discussion of Legit analysis see Pindyck & Rubinfeld, Econometric Models and 
Economic Forecasts, McGraw-Hill, 1991. 
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drug abuse (Hildebrandt, 1994). The following list provides the three primary 
objectives of her research. 
• Identify a profile for DoD drug use using legit analysis and the 1992 
Worldwide Survey. 
• Establish a comparison model, using legit analysis, for drug use 
utilizing both civilian (NHSDA) and Military (Worldwide Survey) data. 
• Examine existing literature which compares military and civilian drug 
abuse. 
3. Cost Analysis 
Ms. Miki Terasawa completed a study entitled: "Estimation of Invisible 
Costs: Drug Abuse Costs to the Navy before Detection." Her paper develops 
a conceptual framework to identify and estimate the invisible costs of drug 
abuse in the Navy. Experimental regressions were conducted on the model she 
formulated using hypothetical data. Increased hospitalization due to drug abuse 
is the subject of the analysis. Unknowns such as the rates of addiction and 
detection are estimated. In addition to the conceptual model, Ms. Tera·sawa 
conducted an exhaustive literature search on the costs of drug abuse using 
DIALOG Information Services. The literature search resulted in 1,260 items 
being accessed, examined, and either pursued or rejected. No studies were 
found which directly focused on the invisible costs of drug abuse in the Navy 
(Terasawa, 1994). 3 
3Terasawa interviewed (by phone) three acknowledged experts at the Research Triangle 
Institute (RTI) who have worked extensively with Drug Abuse {Anderson, Bray, & French}. All 
three verified the lack of concrete studies that approach a credible estimation of social cost 
associated with drug abuse; however, several conceptual models do exist. See Terasawa's 
research for a discussion of these other cost models. 
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Ill. BACKGROUND OF DRUG ABUSE POLICIES AND PROGRAMS 
This chapter reviews the historical background and current status of the 
National, Department of Defense (DoD), and Navy drug control policies. 
National drug control policies are discussed particularly as they relate to the 
DoD and Navy programs. The primary Navy drug abuse prevention programs 
are illustrated, with special emphasis given to drug testing (through urinalysis) 
and the Personal Responsibility and Values Education and Training (PREVENT) 
program. 
There have been many policy adjustments to the Navy and DoD drug 
abuse programs. During this period, drug use by military personnel has declined 
steadily. Figure 3-1 graphically illustrates the reduction for each Service. 
DoD HISTORICAL DRUG TRENDS 
(Any Drug Use in the Past 30 Days) 





0.0 ARMY NAVY USMC USAF 
19800 30.7 33.7 37.7 14.5 
1982111 26.2 16.2 20.6 11.9 
1985~ > 11.5 10.3 9.9 4.5 
19880 6.9 5.4 4.0 2.1 
1992. 3.9 4.0 5.6 1.2 
Figure 3-1: DoD Historical Drug Trends 
Source: 1992 Worldwide Survey 
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A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF NAVY DRUG CONTROL POLICIES 
The history of the Navy's drug control policies are highlighted in the 
following areas: 
• Drug Testing through random urinalysis. 
• A slow tightening of the criteria used to administratively separate drug 
abusers. 
• Drug abuse education and training programs introduced through the 
Navy Alcohol and other Drug Abuse Program (NADAP). 
• Programs developed and administered at the command level by 
personnel assigned collateral duty responsibilities. 
By reviewing the chronological listing of major milestones in the Navy's 
"war on drugs," the development and implementation of these policies can be 
shown. 
MAJOR MILESTONES IN DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION INITIATIVES 
• OPNAVINST 5350.4 is issued (first in a series of drug abuse instructions outlining 
procedural guidance and responsibilities for the Navy). 
• DoD authorizes the use of urinalysis for disciplinary and administrative purposes. 
• Drug labs begin testing for cannabinoids (THC). Portable urinalysis testing 
equipment (for THC) is distributed. 
• The, Officers and Chief Petty Officers (CPOs) "one drug incident and you're' out" 
policy is established. E-1 to E-6 personnel are given greater flexibility. 
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• The fifth Navy drug screening lab is established. Labs are converted to forensic 
operation, significantly reducing false positives from approximately 0.5% to zero (as 
of September, 1994). 
• Education video produced on the drug testing process: Title, "Navy Drug Screening: 
Basic Tool for Zero Tolerance." 
• Navy Alcohol Safety Action Program (NASAP) and the Navy Drug Safety Action 
Program (NADSAP) curricula combined. 
• Substance Abuse Coordinator (SAC) curriculum developed and instruction initiated. 
• Gas Chromatography/Mass Spectrometry (GC/MSI process begins at the Navy drug 
labs to assist in confirming positive urinalysis reports. 
• General Military Training (GMT) module on drug and alcohol abuse distributed 
fleetwide. 
• Portable kit urinalysis testing is discontinued. 
• Radioimmunoassay (RIA) screening and GC/MS confirmation required at all drug 
labs. THC cut-off levels reduced. 
• Drug abuse policy is tightened. Two confirmed pos1t1ves requires mandatory 
separation for E-1 through E-6. Officer and CPO policy of separation after first 
incident remains in effect (NAVOP 125/85). 
• Alcohol and Drug Abuse Manager and Supervisors (ADAMS) course developed. 
• Drug labs lower cut-off levels for THC and cocaine. 
• Urinalysis policy tightens for new recruits. Drug test showing THC positive on 
arrival at basic training is counted as first drug incident (service record documents 
incident). Prior to this, the first 48-hour THC positive was not documented or 
counted as an initial incident. 
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• Drug abuse policy tightens. Junior enlisted (E-4 and above) are processed for 
separation after the first drug incident. 
• Drug abuse policy tightens. All E-1 's and above are mandatorily processed for 
separation after a first-time drug abuse offense. 
• Drug labs lower cut-off levels on three drugs (THC, Cocaine, and Amphetamines). 
• SECNA V directs NADSAP name change to PREVENT due to additional course 
content and the prevention education nature of the training (which had been added 
since 1 990). The additional behavioral issues added to the PREVENT program 
include, sexual responsibility (e.g., sexual assault & HIV/AIDS), suicide prevention, 
core values, communication skills, stress reduction, and other high risk 
characteristics. 
B. CURRENT NAVY DRUG CONTROL POLICY 
The Navy today has one simple drug abuse policy for all its service 
members: mandatory processing for separation of all first-time drug abuse 
offenders. Those individuals who are medically diagnosed as drug-dependent 
are offered Veterans Administration treatment at the time of their separation. 
Random urinalysis is conducted monthly at every Navy command at a 1 0-20 
percent rate. The urinalysis is truly random, from the most senior officer d?wn 
to the seaman recruit (E-1 ). 
Drug testing through urinalysis is the primary emphasis of the Navy's 
detection and deterrence policy for controlling drug abuse in the Navy. In a 
1992 policy message, zero tolerance was defined as including gil pay grades 
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(E-1 and above). For the first time, a true zero tolerance policy was initiated 
throughout the Navy. In the policy message, drug testing was given credit for 
being an effective means of deterring drug abuse (CNO, 1992). In fact, the 
Navy's office of Drug and Alcohol Abuse Prevention (Pers-63) contends that 
"urinalysis is the single most effective program for deterring and detecting illicit 
drug use" (Pers-63, 1994). 
The impact and importance of random drug testing appears to be 
growing. The Commander-in-Chief of the Atlantic Fleet (CINCLANTFL T) 
recently showed concern at the wide variance in drug testing within his 
commands. He tightened the 1 0-20 percent monthly testing rate in the 
following message: 
CINCLANTFL T commands are directed to review {their drug 
testing programs} and establish a goal of maintaining a minimum 
{monthly} rate of 18-20 percent command testing. If you think 
you need to do {more testing} more often, do it. Drugs are still 
out there. (CINCLANTFL T, 1994). 
C. NATIONAL AND DOD DRUG CONTROL POLICY 
The national drug control policy has directly impacted the DoD drug 
policies by directing resources from purely military uses to the broader national 
scope. Prior to 1989, DoD's primary Counterdrug (CO) mission involved 
supporting military personnel demand reduction programs (e.g., drug testing 
and education). There was not a centralized CD program (or budget), and 
limited military involvement in the national regime consisted of ad hoc missions 
in support of various Drug Law Enforcement Agencies (OLEAs). By the mid to 
late 1980's, the national drug habit was viewed as reaching a crisis level. 
Drug-related crimes increased dramatically during this period and public opinion 
peaked, with a majority of Americans identifying drug use as the greatest threat 
facing our nation (National Drug Control Strategy (NDCS), 1992). 
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Congress began to look for a military response to the illegal drug flow into the 
country. 
In 1986, The House of Representatives passed an amendment that 
would have directed the military services to become the primary interdiction 
agency and required DoD to "seal the borders" within 45 days after the 
passage of the act (Reuter, 1988). The amendment failed in the Senate, but 
the 1986 Omnibus Drug Control Act marked a significant milestone in the 
military's involvement in drug interdiction. In 1989 President Bush announced 
a comprehensive National Drug Control Strategy and on September 18, 1989, 
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney stated: 
The supply of illicit drugs to the United States from abroad, the 
associated violence and international instability, and the use of 
illegal drugs within the country pose a direct threat to the 
sovereignty and security of the country. (Ahart & Stiles, 1991) 
Congress responded with far-reaching, congressionally mandated DoD missions 
in the FY -89 Defense Authorization Act. The act, detailed in the Congressional 
Hearing on Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts (1991 ), directed DoD to: 
• Serve as the single lead agency of the Federal Government for the 
Detection and Monitoring (D&M) of aerial and maritime transit of 
illegal drugs into the United States. 
• Integrate into an effective communications network the Command, 
Control, Communications, and Technical Intelligence (C31) assets of 
the United States that are dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs. 
• Approve and fund state governors' plans for enhanced drug 
interdiction and counterdrug role for the National Guard in "state 
status." 
In 1990 and 1991, congress expanded the DoD role. The CD mission 
was given a higher priority as a National Security Objective (Comprehensive 
Review DoD Counterdrug Program, 1994). Funding was consolidated and 
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resources were dramatically increased for the military to expand its 
"internal war" into a "national war on drugs." Figure 3-2 shows the rapid 
increase in the total federal CD budget from FY -81 to FY -95. The DoD portion 




12.0 E1] Total Federal 
---ooo 





6 0 ................................. . . 
CD 




81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 
Figure 3-2: Total Federal and DoD Drug Control Budget 
Source: National Drug Control Strategy, 1994 
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The FY -95 federal budget includes a record $13.2 billion request for the 
current administration's new anti-drug strategy. While the overall federal 
strategy boosts spending on treatment and prevention throughout many 
governmental agencies, DoD's drug control budget was reduced by 23.4 
percent (the most significant reduction of any federal agency). Interdiction 
funding dropped by over $200 million, but there were also drops in the demand 
reduction portions of the DoD budget which were passed along to each of the 
military services. The Demand Reduction budget line contains the Navy's drug 
prevention program funding, which has actually decreased over the past three 
years. Figures 3-3 and 3-4 illustrate the shift in resources from DoD to the 
other federal agencies: 
Total Drug Control Budget 
(FY-93) 











Total DoD: $1.14 Billion 
Figure 3-3: Total Federal and DoD Drug Budget (FY-93) 
Source: National Drug Control Strategy, 1994 
26 











Total DoD: $874 Million 
Figure 3-4: Total Federal and DoD Drug Budget (FY-95) 
Source: National Drug Control Strategy, 1994 
Table 3-1 depicts the DoD drug resource funding decline from FY-93 to 
the FY -95 budget request. 
Prevention $89.1 $79.9 (1 0.3) 
Research and Development 34.1 39.5 15.8 
State and Local Assistance 375.0 317.2 (15.4) 
Treatment 11.0 9.9 (1 0.0) 
Interdiction 631.5 427.8 (32.2) 
Total: 1140.7 874.2 (23.4) 
Table 3-1: Department of Defense Drug Control Budget ($ in Millions) 
Source: National Drug Control Strategy (Budget Summary), 1994 
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While the Federal drug control budgets have been growing rapidly, the 
DoD budgets are being significantly reduced. Large parts of this reduction are 
in the area of drug interdiction, but as Table 3-1 reveals, all but the R&D 
funding lines have incurred notable decreases. 
The Navy's own counterdrug resources have been consolidated since 
1990 within the DCNO (Plans, Policy, & Operations) Counterdrug Branch 
(N-515). The Navy's drug prevention programs are now tied directly to the 
same DoD budget requests that contain the congressionally mandated "war on 
drugs" initiatives. Table 3-2 illustrates the FY -92 through FY -94 breakdown 
of the Navy's CD demand reduction budget. The FY-94 $24.5 million demand 
reduction budget line accounts for approximately 1 2 percent of the Navy's total 
$220 million CD budget (CD Spreadsheet, 1994). 
D. THE NAVY DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMS 
"Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control" is the subject of 
OPNAV Instruction 5350.48. It details the Navy's drug control programs and 
is the guiding policy containing all the elements of the Navy Alcohol and other 
Drug Abuse Program (NADAP). NADAP focuses on drug testing and education 
as the primary means of attacking drug and alcohol abuse in the Navy. 
It is difficult to separate drug abuse from alcohol abuse in the Navy's 
NADAP program since the mode of addressing these addictive and destructive 
behaviors is similar; however, the obvious difference is that any form of drug 
abuse is illegal. The Navy recognizes alcoholism as a treatable disease 
(ADAMS Resource Guide, 1993) but considers drug abuse as simply an illegal 
activity (whether or not it is treatable). Therefore, the NADAP drug abuse 
efforts are directed primarily at drug testing, with any preventive and education 
benefits derived from spin-off alcohol abuse training. 
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PROJECT #8351/USN DEMAND REDUCTION BUDGET 
($000) 
ACCOUNT fY .. 92 
_c_ FY~93 
1. CNO 9BF 85 85 
.,. 
2. ODRTF 2,659 4,080 
3. BUMED 18,998 17,939 
4. NAVAlR 11 3 
,5.BUPERS 
••••••••• 
2,656 ., ,984 
. 
6. NAVFAC 53 55 
21 11 
354 365 
9. CINCNA VEUR . •••,•••······· 51 53 
10~ CINCPACFLT . 164 169 
2,329 2,309 
i2.NAVrELCClM >,,· ... ,.,.·.·.· 23 24 
,, ....... ,· .... ·.· ., ..... , /·•·'·• .».··· 
. 13~ NAVY· KIDS· " 00 6 
00 00 
t5'. COMMUNrrY .... ·· . ···. 00 00 
· .·,·.,,,, .. ' OUTREAcl-r••,;,,.> · •, > , ••. >,·•"''' 
00 00 
27,404 27,083 
Table 3-2: USN Demand Reduction Budget (FY93-FY94) 
Source: Office of Budget and Reports (NCB 1) 
* Includes additional $500 for OPN. 





















1 . DDRTF- Drug Demand Reduction Task Force (also controls Community Outreach Acct) 
2. OCPM - Office of Civilian Personnel Management assumed responsibility for 
Navy civilian drug testing in FY-94. 
3. SSPO (Suomarine Strategic Program Office). Drug Testing funds for Civilian drug 
testing move to OCPM in FY -94 
4. In 93/94 CNO 9BF Included NPS and Military District, Washington. FY-94 funds 
moved to different accounts. 
5. FY-92/93 is Obligation Data, FY-94 is Allocation Data. 
6. Community Outreach is O&M,N Funding. 
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The primary programs with relationships specifically addressing drug 
abuse include: 
MAJOR USN DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMS 
• Drug testing through urinalysis 
• PREVENT (Level I) education and intervention 
• Alcohol and Drug Abuse Managers and.Supervisors (ADAMS) 
• Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA) program 
• Other Training/Education: 
- Initial level recruit training (4 hours) 
- Command Indoctrination 
- General Military Training (GMT) 
- Miscellaneous Leadership Education 
Even though these programs specifically reference drug abuse in some 
form, they also address alcohol and other high-risk addictive behaviors. In 
some cases, drug abuse is a minor topic compared with other course material. 
It is an accurate observation to state that the only "pure" drug abuse 
prevention tool the Navy employs today is drug testing. 
The rest of this section will discuss the first four major drug control 
programs listed above. The "Other Training/Education" programs are not 
addressed due to their numerous components and the wide variation 
(concerning amount and quality of drug abuse education) in each course. 
1. Drug Testing (Urinalysis Program) 
Drug testing is the cornerstone of the Navy's drug prevention program. 
From a resource perspective, the urinalysis program is given the "highest 
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priority" in the CD prevention budget. 4 At least 90 percent of the $24.5 
million FY -94 CD budget supports the drug testing program. Randomly 
sampling 10-20 percent of Navy personnel every month requires testing almost 
2 million samples each year. Table 3-3 depicts the number of urine samples 
tested and the confirmed number of drug positives over the past nine years: 
Samples tested 1.82M 2.3M 2.06M 
(Million) 
Number Positive 54K 47K 30K 
(Thousand) 
Percent Positive 2.98% 2.37% 1.45% 
Table 3-3: Navy Urinalysis Testing Program 
Source: Chief of Naval Technical Training, 1994 
a. Drug Testing of New Accessions 
1.75M 1.81 M 1 .68M 
1 1 K 14K 13K 
.64% .78% .81% 
Drug testing is a key disqualifier when new accessions first enter 
the Navy. Under the purview of The Chief of Naval Education and Training 
(CNET), all new recruits are tested immediately upon entering basic training. 
Besides the drug testing, new recruits are screened through a process called a 
"moment of truth." This occurs within the first few days after the recruit 
enters basic training. The recruits are told they have "one last chance" to 
reveal personal disqualifiers they might be concealing (e.g., lying about their 
age, use of drugs, felonies, etc ... ). Any recruit indicating that they have lied 
4Based on interview with Captain M. Weisberg, USN, DCNO (Policy, Plans, & Operations) 
Counterdrug Branch (N-515) by the author on 09 August 1994. 
31 
is taken to a "moment of truth" interview where they are evaluated. Table 3-4 
shows those new entrants who were discharged for drug abuse from urinalysis 
and the "moment of truth" interviews. 5 
I NEW AccEsSIONs ·••···· ·····jfv;$7 
Urinalysis Testing' 





1,056 . 1 '122 
351 366 
1,407 1,488 
Table 3-4: New Entrant Separations For Drug Abuse 
Source: Chief of Naval Technical Training, 1994 
631 939 
525 442 
1 '156 1,381 
Each new recruit assigned to a Navy "A" school after basic 
training goes through an additional drug test upon reporting for duty at the 
training command. CNET alone tested approximately 255,000 samples in FY-
93 (Interview with Massengill, 1994). 
First-term recruit attrition is approximately 30 percent annually. 
In an effort to decrease this rate, the Navy implemented a psychological 
screening program (N-AFMET) in October 1991. This program is based on the 
Air Force's AFMET program. 6 The USAF has successfully used AFMET since 
the mid 1970's to screen out USAF recruits likely to attrite. The N-AFMET is 
/ 
a three-phased psychological screening process conducted within the first 48-
hours after a recruit arrives at basic training. First-year results revealed that out 
of the 713 recruits separated in 1991 due to the N-AFMET program, 36 
5Positive drug test numbers in this Table are not reflected in the "number positive" results 
shown in Table 3-3. 
6 AFMET is the Air Force Mental Evaluation Test. Implications of the AFMET program are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV. 
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percent had some variation of an alcohol or drug related diagnosis. A 
significant proportion (9.8 percent) were diagnosed as alcohol or drug 
dependent (ldar and Scaramozzino, 1992). 
b. Quality Control (QC) In Drug Testing 
Due to the severe implications of a false positive report on a drug 
sample, the Navy's drug screening laboratories conduct rigorous QC programs. 
At least 20 percent of all samples tested are the labs' own quality control 
specimens, and approximately one-fourth of each lab's annual budget is spent 
within the quality control department (San Diego Drug Screening Laboratory, 
1994). Additionally, each lab undergoes six inspections throughout the year. 
One of these inspections includes certified inspectors from the National 
Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) who are experts in the field of forensic drug 
urinalysis. 
The external OC program is conducted by the Armed Forces 
Institute of Pathology (AFIP). AFIP has been providing quality control for over 
20 years. The QC program is divided into two segments, the Open Proficiency 
and the Blind Proficiency Test. 7 
(1) The Open Proficiency Test. In the open proficiency 
test, AFIP sends between 20 and 24 positive control samples each month to 
the drug labs. The labs know the samples are positive; their goal is to 
determine the drug and concentration level in each sample. The samples are 
"spiked" at a point near the cut-off level to judge the accuracy of the test-
measuring instruments. AFIP tabulates the results and provides a monthly 
statistical feedback report to each lab. 
7 
Much of the information concerning the AFIP testing procedures was gained through a phone 
interview with Lt. Col. Kuhlman, USAF, AFIP (Drug Detection and Quality Control Lab) by the 
author on 30 August 1994. Lt. Col. Kuhlman also provided written background and briefing papers 
on the testing process. 
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(2) The Blind Proficiency Test. The blind proficiency test 
is the most critical aspect of the QC program. Approximately 624 samples are 
sent to each DoD lab every quarter via command level organizations. The 
samples are labeled with fake social security numbers and submitted with the 
commands' normal monthly submission. About 80 percent of these AFIP 
control samples are negative (i.e. contain no drugs) while approximately 20 
percent are positive (contain drug concentrations above the allowed cut-off 
rate). AFIP uses this proficiency test to verify that the labs are accurately 
diagnosing routine urine samples and properly reporting the results. 
c. Reliability 
Maintaining the reliability of the drug laboratories is a primary 
mission of the AFIP Drug Detection and Quality Assurance department. A 
twenty-year study of quarterly blind QC reports revealed an extremely effective 
and reliable drug testing program (Kuhlman & Smith, 1993). The results show 
that in the early years (prior to 1983) the laboratories produced false positive 
rates of about 0. 5 percent and false negative rates of approximately 12 
percent. Since 1983 there have been no true laboratory false positive reports 
in over 183,000 samples. The false negative rate is less than two percent. 
The labs have proved to be exceptionally reliable in every area. The report finds 
that the weakest link in the drug test procedure is the collection site (e.g., 
inverting several of the social security numbers on a sample). 
2. The PREVENT Program8 
The Navy first established contracted substance abuse education 
programs in 1974. The purpose of these early programs was to provide 
8 Portions of this section were obtained through an interview with Ms. Camille Ross and Ms. 
Viktoria Johnston (San Diego PREVENT office) by the author on 15 July 1994. 
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training for individuals after an alcohol or drug related incident. Since then, the 
program has changed names and focus several times. Program titles for the 
Navy's substance abuse programs have included: 
• Navy Alcohol Safety Action Program (NASAP) 
• Navy Drug Safety Action Program (NDSAP) 
• Navy Substance Abuse Prevention Program (NASAPP) 
• Navy Alcohol and Drug Safety Action Program (NADSAP) 
• Personal Responsibility and Values Education and Training (PREVENT) 
The change to PREVENT occurred in 1993 at the direction of the 
Secretary of the Navy. The course was modified to include a number of other 
behavioral issues, with a "prevention" vice "after-incident" focus. 
Approximately 80 percent of PREVENT attendees are purely "prevention 
oriented" (i.e., they are not attending the course as a result of an alcohol or 
drug related episode). 
a. Background 
PREVENT, as the name implies, focuses on the personal 
responsibility issues facing each person who attends. The course content 
addresses pressures and addictions toward alcohol, drugs, sexual behaviors and 
other health related issues. As the PREVENT contractor's course description 
explains, the goal of PREVENT is to change destructive .behaviors through the 
conscious control of one's mental, verbal, or physical responses (PREVENT 
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Profile, 1993). The 32 hours (one week) of classroom instruction and the four 
hours of independent assignments focus on developing skills of: 
• Adaptability 
• Decision making 
• Resistance to addiction practices 
• Interpersonal responsibility 
PREVENT contract offices provide services at thirty-one main sites 
and over 100 ancillary locations. The program serves approximately 2,600 
commands, both ashore and afloat. The course is highly flexible, with 
weekend, night, and even deployed variations possible. The historical number 
of personnel completing the NADSAP/PREVENT program is graphically depicted 
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Figure 3·5: NADSAP/PREVENT Graduates 
Source: Pers-63, 1994 
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• FY-94 Projected 
Students attending PREVENT complete a questionnaire before and 
after the course of instruction. Additionally, representative samples of 
graduates are surveyed three and twelve months following the course. Using 
the questionnaire and follow-up surveys, the contractor is able to make 
quantitative estimates concerning the effectiveness of the PREVENT training. 
These estimates are discussed further in Chapter IV of this thesis. 
b. PREVENT Funding 
PREVENT is a $3.5 million Times and Material contract funded 
through multiple sources including: 
• SUPERS 63 
• DCNO (N-515) Drug Demand Reduction Office 
• Major Claimants 
• Local Commands 
The PREVENT resource sponsor is N-1 (via SUPERS), while the major claimant 
and program management responsibilities are shared between SUPERS and 
CNET. 9 Figure 3-6 shows the historical trend in funding provided PREVENT 
over the past few fiscal years. Funding shortfalls are generally absorbed by 
reducing the number of classes. An unanticipated cut of one million dollars in 
PREVENT funds during FY -94 resulted in canceling several courses (especially 
those courses planned for deployed units). 10 The curriculum was also 
shortened by four hours, but this may have been a coincidence. 
9 . N1 (DCNO, Manpower & Personnel) is the Support Resource Sponsor. The funds are routed 
through SUPERS. 
1 0Though the initial cut was $1 Million, some additional funds were redirected to help make-up 
the shortfall. The actual cut for FY -94 came to approximately $700K. However, PREVENT classes 
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Figure 3-6: NADSAP/PREVENT Resource Funding 
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c. PREVENT Methodology and Course Content 
The PREVENT class size typically ranges from 1 5 to 20 persons. 
The course is facilitated by a professionally trained leader who uses small group 
techniques in a "peer interaction model" (PREVENT Fact Sheet, 1993). 
PREVENT's target audience is enlisted personnel in their first five years of 
service. The American Council on Education has certified PREVENT for two 
semester hours and The University of Arizona (Extended University) offers 3.6 
Continuing Education Units to those who have completed the course. 
Figure 3-7 illustrates the amount of time PREVENT devotes to various 
behavioral issues. 
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Figure 3-7: PREVENT Curriculum Topics 
Source: PREVENT Fact Sheet, 1993 
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Time Spent (In Hours) 
9 
4 6 8 
Hours 
10 
Within these behavioral issues are specific sections involving a 
wide range of topics, including: 
• Alcohol and Drug Abuse 
• Other Substance Abuse (e.g., nicotine and tobacco) 
• High-risk Sexual Behavior (e.g., AIDS/HIV, promiscuity, and 
unprotected sex) 
• Sexual Harassment and Assault 
• Obesity/Physical Fitness 
• Stress Reduction 
• Suicide Prevention 
• Navy/USMC Core Values 
• Communication Skills 
The group setting of the PREVENT class is relaxed and 
informal. 11 The instructor is a civilian who has been trained in controlling and 
facilitating group dynamics. The students are provided a course workbook that 
contains the syllabus shown in Table 3-5. 
11 The thesis author attended the PREVENT course offered in San Diego, CA (July 1994). 
Methodology and course content is provided from personal observation and the course workbook. 
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PREVENT COURSE SYLLABUS 
1. PREVENTION EDUCATION FOR ORGANIZATIONAL READINESS AND INDIVIDUAL READINESS 
A. Prevention Education and Skills for Personal Control in the Military Environment 
1.Core Values 
2.Rights and Responsibilities 
3.Total Quality Leadership 
B. Prevention Education and skills for Personal Control in the On Duty Environment 
1 . Personal Fitness Practices 
2. Personal Behavior and Competency for Duty 
C. Prevention Education and Skills for Personal Control in the Off Duty Environment 
1 . Personal Fitness Practices 
2. Personal Behavior 
II. ADDICTION PRACTICES 
A. The Concept of Attachment 
1. Attachment and External and Internal Standards 
2. Tracking Personal Attachments 
3. Family History and Attachments 
B. Determining Attachments in Situations 
1. To Alcohol and other Substance Practices 
2. To Sexual Practices 
3. To Physical Activity Practices 
4. To Nutrition Practices 
5. To Mental, Verbal, and Body Reactions 
C. Consequences of Attachments in Situations 
1. To Alcohol and other Substance Practices 
2. To Sexual Practices 
3. To Physical Activity Practices 
4. To Nutrition Practices 
5. To Mental, Verbal, and Body Reactions 
D. Mental, Verbal, and Body Response Skills to Apply to Attachments in Situations 
Ill. ADAPTABIUTY 
A. The Concept of Pressure 
1. Sources of Pressure in Situations (Internal & External) 
B. The Mental, Verbal, and Body Responses Indicative of Pressure in Situations 
C. Duration of Pressure 
1 . Short and Long term 
2. Pressure and Suicide 
D. Mental, Verbal, and Body Response Skills to Respond to Pressure in Situations 
E. Personal Commitments and Probabilities Regarding Responsible Action: in Military Situations, 
in Alcohol and other Substance Related Situations, and in Sexual Situations. 
IV. DECISION MAKING 
A. Individual Responses in the Behavior Change Process 
1. Selecting a Goal and Taking Action 
2. Personal Style in the Actual Situation 
3. Examining Alternatives and Consequences 
4. Acknowledging Limits for Personal Change 
5. Personal Commitment to Behavior Change 
6. Mental, Verbal, and Body Response Skills for Maintaining Change in SituatK>ns 
Table 3-5: PREVENT Course Syllabus 
Source: PREVENT Course Workbook 
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3. Alcohol and Drug Abuse Managers/Supervisors (ADAMS) 
The ADAMS course is a one-day training seminar designed for managers 
and supervisors. OPN~ VINST 5350.4S requires all managers and supervisors 
to attend ADAMS at least once in their naval career. 12 There are two versions 
of ADAMS (OPNAVINST 5350.4S): 
• Managers Version: Developed for commanding officers and senior 
enlisted managers (e.g., command master chiefs). Teaches the 
managers how to develop and evaluate effective command programs. 
• Supervisors Version: Designed for E-7 supervisors and above. Trains 
the supervisors on how to counsel junior personnel concerning 
substance abuse. It also teaches the skills to recognize substance 
abuse and how to properly document problems related to the abuse. 
ADAMS training began in 1985 after DoD mandated education and 
training in alcohol and drug abuse prevention. The DoD instruction directs the 
military services to: 
... educate and/or train all military commanders, military and 
civilian supervisors ... {about} alcohol and drug abuse prevention 
policy and effective measures to alleviate problems associated 
with alcohol and drug abuse. (DoDINST 101 0.5) 
N-1 (via SUPERS) is the resource sponsor of ADAMS. SUPERS and CNET both 
serve as the major claimants and program managers. 
120PNAVINST 5350.48 is currently being revised. Future revisions will require all Navy 
supervisors E-6 through 0-4 to attend ADAMS (ADAMS Facilitator Manual, 1993). 
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4. Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA) Program 
All Navy commands, regardless of their size, are required to have a 
DAPA. As described in OPNAVINST 5350.48, the DAPA is responsible to the 
commanding officer for managing and administrating the command's alcohol 
and drug abuse program. In addition, the DAPA oversees the command's 
obesity aftercare program. 
The DAPA is encouraged to be a "top-performing" volunteer who is an 
E-6 or above. All DAPAs must serve in their assignment for at least one year. 
Commands having more than 1,000 personnel must have a full-time DAPA 
assigned; smaller commands are allowed to assign the DAPA role as a collateral 
duty. Other requirements for holding the DAPA title include the following: 
(OPNAVINST 5350.48) 
• Completing the DAPA course (A-501-0060). 
• No drug or alcohol incident within the last 2 years. 
• If recovering from substance abuse, must have 2 years of sobriety. 
• If recovering from chronic obesity, must have 2 years in a program of 
recovery. 
• Mature individual possessing credibility with personnel at every level 
in the command. 
The command DAPA is required to be designated in writing. As stated 
earlier, the DAPA reports directly to the commanding officer on the command's 
substance abuse programs. The DAPA's responsibilities include the following: 
(OPNAVINST 5350.48) 
• Advise the commanding officer on the administration of the command 
alcohol and other drug abuse programs. 
43 
• Conduct administrative screenings of identified alcohol and drug 
abusers and personnel who do not meet physical readiness standards; 
report findings to the commanding officer. 
• Coordinate the presentation of Level I alcohol and other drug abuse 
awareness education in the command. 
• Establish a Level I intervention program for designated individuals. 
• Act as the aftercare coordinator for the command. Coordinate and 
monitor the aftercare plan for personnel returning to the command 
after completing the Level I or Level II programs for alcohol and 
compulsive overeating/food abuse. 
• Serve as the command self-referral agent. 
• Prepare the Drug and Alcohol Abuse Reports (DAARs) for the 
commanding officer's signature. 
As with the ADAMS program, N-1 (via SUPERS) is the resource sponsor 
of the Navy's DAPA program. SUPERS and CNET share the responsibility as 
major claimant and program manager. 
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IV. MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION 
This chapter considers effective methods to prevent drug abuse in the 
Navy. In its most basic form, "effectiveness" can be defined by how well one 
achieves a desired result. To give "effectiveness" a scope, there must be a 
quantifiable measurement along with a meaningful standard. When considering 
drug abuse prevention in the Navy, the desired result is reduced drug usage. 
The quantifiable measurement is twofold: (1) the number of self-reported drug 
users (as described in the Worldwide survey), and (2) the number of personnel 
testing positive from a urinalysis test. The standard is "zero" abuse. 
Therefore, if the Navy's drug abuse prevention program was perfectly effective 
there would be no self-reporting drug abusers and no personnel testing positive 
in random drug urinalysis tests. 
The Navy attempts to reduce drug usage through two means: detection 
and deterrence. As discussed in earlier chapters, drug testing is considered a 
"major means of detecting and deterring drug abuse" (OPNAVINST 5350.48). 
The Navy adds training and education to the deterrence side, primarily through 
command level education programs (like ADAMS and DAPA) and the PREVENT 
course. This chapter opens with a discussion of factors influencing drug abuse. 
Next, the effectiveness of drug testing and PREVENT as tools of detection and 
deterrence are analyzed. The cognitive/lifestyle approach to behavioral change 
is reviewed, followed by a brief analysis of effective drug prevention efforts in 
the Air Force. 
A. FACTORS INFLUENCING DRUG ABUSE 
There have been many studies focusing on the reasons why an individual 
chooses to abuse drugs. As Contreras and Munger ( 1994) found in their 
research comparing civilian and Navy drug prevention programs, researchers 
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have begun to catalog "risk factors" into two areas: individual and socio-
environmental components. Their extensive literature research is illustrated in 
the following "risk factor" table: 
'/··<< .. ,,. ·'' , .. ··.·'. .. ·.·' 
INDIVIDIJAL.··FACTORS , ... , SOCI~RONMEN!ALFACTORS 
Antisocial Behavior Peer drug use 
Low academic achievement/goals Peer deviance 
Low religiosity Peer rejection 
Early persistent deviant behaviors Parental/older sibling drug use 
Low self-esteem Social pressure 
Inadequate social bonding Low socioeconomic status 
Emotional outbursts Lack of social mobility 
Non-conventionality Availability of drugs 
Poor relationship with parents Social stress 
Low self-efficacy Socio-cultural norms favoring use 
Alienation/rebelliousness Family conflict 
Lack of conformity High parental tolerance for deviance 
Sensation seeking Family disorganization 
Behavioral disorders Low bonding to family 
Psychological distress or depression 
Early drug experimentation 
Self-derogation 
Aggresivity 
Table 4-1: Risk Factors For Drug Abuse 
Source: Conteras and Munger, 1994 
From a military perspective, Bray et al. determined in the 1 ~92 
Worldwide survey that drug abuse is related to a number of sociodemographic 
and psychological factors (see Table 4-2). 
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His results correlate drug abuse with the following characteristics: 
PREDICTORS OF DRUG ABUSE 
• Male (twice as likely to abuse drugs as females) 
• Enlisted ranks (versus officers) 
• Pay grade/age (lower pay grades and age groups are more likely to 
use drugs) 
• Hispanic (highest use rates of all races) 
• Lower educational level 
• Single or not living with spouse 
Using regression analysis, Bray et al. found that drug abuse among 
enlisted males is strongly predicted by whether or not urinalysis testing is being 
conducted, how others in their social network view drug abuse, and their 
attitudes about marijuana. The regression revealed similar results to the list 
shown above. The following are the significant predictors of drug use (among 
enlisted males), when controlling for other variables using regression analysis: 
PREDICTORS OF DRUG ABUSE (identified through regression analysis) 
• Perceived stress at work (greater stress resulted in more drug use) 
• Service (drug use was more likely in the USA and USN than the 
USAF) 
• Family status (more likely among single and married-unaccompa~ied) 
• Region (more likely in America than overseas) 
• Pay grade (more likely among E1-E3) 
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[ CHARACTERIST1CS · • · >1· ARMY l NAVY 1 MAFUNECORP l AIRFORce··· l TOTAt:DOO 
SEX: 
Male 8.1 7.6 10.9 2.5 6.7 
Female 5.6 3.0 ++ 1.5 3.4 
RACE/ETHNICITY: 
White 8.2 7.6 12.9 2.0 6.6 
Black 6.2 1.7 6.1 2.5 4.2 
Hispanic 8.6 12.7 ++ 5.9 8.9 
Other 9.0 3.6 ** 1.0 4.4 
EDUCATION: 
Less hiqh school Grad ++ ++ ++ ++ ++ 
High school Grad/GED 10.6 8.5 12.5 3.5 9.0 
Some college 7.3 6.3 9.9 2.5 5.5 
College degree or higher 2.8 2.3 0.9 1.0 1.9 
AGE: 
20 and under 13.1 16.0 15.8 3.3 12.9 
21-25 12.2 10.3 17.6 3.6 10.3 
26-34 6.2 3.7 2.7 2.1 3.8 
35 and older 2.8 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.9 
MARITAL STATUS: 
Not married 11.7 10.6 14.3 3.9 9.9 
Married. not present 8.0 6.4 ++ 3.1 7.1 
Married. spouse present 5.4 3.2 6.2 1.5 3.6 
PAY GRADE: 
E1-E3 19.5 17.8 17.8 4.3 15.5 
E4-E6 7.7 4.7 8.3 2.7 5.3 
E7-E9 2.7 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.9 
01-03 1.9 1.7 •• 0.6 1.2 
04-010 2.6 0.4 2.3 0.4 1.3 
TOTAL 7.7 6.6 10.7 2.3 6.2 
Table 4-2: Any Drug Use (Past 12 Months), Percent by Sociodemographic 
Characteristics, (Source: 19S2 Worldwide Survey) 
Notes: + + Unreliable Estimate 
* * Estimate rounds to zero 
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B. DRUG TESTING: AN EFFECTIVE METHOD OF DETERRENCE? 
Drug testing as an effective deterrent is limited largely to a punitive 
function. Drug testing alone may cause a behavioral modification but the 
change is a result of a perceived threat (e.g., loss of job), not as a result of a 
value or moral shift. The detection effectiveness of drug testing (i.e., how well 
does drug testing identify drug abusers) is subject to a wide range of variables. 
For example, the timing of the drug test, the method of testing, the chain of 
custody, lab procedures, and whether the user is "gaming" the system. These 
are just a few of the possible factors which are beyond the scope of this 
study. 13 For the purposes of this thesis, the effectiveness of drug testing is 
analyzed as it pertains to its deterrent function. 14 
1. Drug Testing in the Civilian Sector 
Drug testing in the civilian sector has become increasingly popular as a 
deterrence tool. Each year the American Management Association (AMA) 
conducts a survey of its corporate membership. 15 Over 7,000 U.S. 
organizations are members of the AMA, accounting for about 25 percent of the 
total American work-force. 
13L T J.R. Jones, USN, a graduate student at the Naval Postgraduate School, is writing a thesis 
that specifically looks at the Navy's drug testing policy. The title of the thesis is, A Change in the 
Navy's Drug Testing Policy: How Will It Affect Cost and the Probability of Detecting a Drug User. 
Publication is expected in the Spring of 1995. 
14 The Navy Personal Research and Development Center (NPRDC) has studied the detection 
effectiveness issue for drug testing. See Thompson & Boyle, Markov Chains for Random Urinalysis 
(Series), NPRDC, San Diego, CA, January, 1994. 
15 The AMA survey is not considered a statistically accurate sampling of all American 
corporations, but it is sufficient to allow statistically valid year-to-year comparisons of its member 
corporations. For the purposes of this thesis, the AMA survey is considered to represent, at the 
very least, a growing trend in the civilian sector toward increased drug testing. 
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Since 1987 (when the initial survey was conducted) I drug testing among major 
American corporations has increased by more than 300 percent (AMA Survey 1 
1994). 
AMA found a direct year-to-year correlation between an increase in 
periodic (or random) testing and a decrease in test-positive ratios. Figure 4-1 
graphically depicts the decreasing positive rate of civilian employees identified 




















Figure 4·1: Civilian Employee Test-Positive Rates 
Source: AMA Research, 1994 
16Drug abuse within the general U.S. population also decreased during this time period, but 
the decrease was not as dramatic as Figure 4-1 suggest. The 1993 Advance Report of the most 
recent NHSDA survey shows a drop in the general population's drug abuse from 14.1 o/o (1988) to 
11.8% (1993). 
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One reason for the increase in civilian testing programs is due to 
government mandate. Department of Transportation regulations, promulgated 
in 1989, require drug testing in specific job categories. However, according to 
AMA, 4 7 percent of the companies reporting drug testing policies were not 
under government compulsion (AMA, 1994). 
Drug testing alone cannot be construed as the only reason for the 
apparent reduction in drug use by civilian employees. On the contrary, the 
AMA reports that drug testing is "rarely a stand-alone policy." Only about ten 
percent of the companies relied on testing alone to deal with employee drug 
abuse. Companies that provided one or more program initiatives in addition to 
drug testing (such as education and awareness or supervisory training) report 
significantly lower test-positive ratios than companies that rely on testing alone. 
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Figure 4-2: Testing Alone versus Testing With Programs 
Source: AMA Research, 1994 
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When civilian corporations were specifically questioned about the 
effectiveness of drug testing as a deterrent against drug abuse, the 
overwhelming majority responded affirmatively. The pie-charts in Figure 4-3 
illustrate the historical shift in corporate attitudes when asked the question: "Is 














Figure 4-3: Corporate Attitudes on The Effectiveness of Drug Testing 
Source: AMA Research, 1994 
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The conclusion from the AMA survey is that drug testing, while an 
effective deterrent against drug abuse, should not be used as a stand-alone 
drug program. The results of the AMA survey are summarized in the following 
quote: 
The findings do provide a statistical case that education, training, 
counseling, and treatment have a measurable effect on drug use. 
Drug testing, where utilized, ought to be part of a comprehensive 
policy that includes these other, demonstrably successful 
initiatives. (AMA Survey, 1994) 
2. Drug Testing in the Military 
All four branches of the military conduct random urinalysis testing as a 
primary means of detecting and deterring drug abuse. Many researchers point 
to the consistent historical reduction in DoD drug abuse rates as evidence that 
the military's drug testing policy is effective. Bray summarizes his conclusions 
regarding the urinalysis program in the following quote: 
The substantial declines in drug use since the urinalysis testing 
program began in 1981 and beliefs of military personnel in its 
deterrent properties lend support to the conclusion that the 
program is an effective strategy for preventing and reducing drug 
use (Bray et al., 1992). 
The effectiveness of deterrence to which Bray is referring appears to be 
linked to four basic conditions: 
• Randomness of the drug test (using a constant model) 
• A clear statement of consequence (for drug abuse) 
• Command level implementation of the program 
• Reliability /believability of the drug test 
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a. Randomness of the Drug Test (Using Constant Model) 
The randomness of drug testing is critical for a successful 
urinalysis program. The Navy has considered several testing models, the most 
noted being the Markov Chain (which uses an Age-Test Model). 17 However, 
NPRDC found that age-testing models can actually reduce effectiveness by 
significantly increasing the time to detection if the drug abuser is "gaming" the 
system (Boyle et al., 1993). Constant strategies are resistant to gaming since 
the probabilities of being tested remain the same regardless of past testing 
history. Most researchers believe gaming is an essential ingredient in a drug 
abuser's strategy to avoid detection. 
A previous Navy drug abuser was interviewed and asked 
specifically about his beliefs concerning the Navy's drug testing program. 18 
The abuser was never identified as a drug user during his enlistment in the 
Navy (in the mid-1980s) even though he was tested at least 1 2 times in five 
years. He recalls that most of his drug-using shipmates believed they could 
"beat the test." He said the key to his avoiding detection was a committed 
gaming strategy which involved: 
• Having inside information (knowing someone who knew when the test 
would be administered). 
• A thorough understanding of the drugs' effect on the body, including 
metabolic rates and body flushing procedures 
• Careful planning to ensure the drug abuse occurred in a time-frame 
when a drug test was least likely to be administered 
17For a full discussion of the Age-Test Model, see Boyle et al., Markov Chains for Random 
Urinalysis (Series), Naval Personnel Research and Development Center, March 1993 and January 
1994. 
18Due to the sensitivity of the information, this interview was conducted on terms of 
anonymity. The person interviewed has been out of the Navy for over eight years and is no longer 
a drug abuser. 
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Clearly, an age-test model enhances an abusers' ability to "game" 
the urinalysis program. NPRDC has recognized this tendency to game the 
system and has therefore determined that the constant model is currently the 
most effective means of implementing an effective drug testing program.19 
b. A Clear Statement of Consequences 
The Department of Labor has found that a clear and 
comprehensive substance abuse policy, that explains the consequences for an 
employee found abusing drugs, is essential to any effective prevention program 
(Department of Labor, 1991 ). In NIDA's monograph series, entitled Drugs in 
the Workplace: Research and Evaluation Data ( 1990), Dr. Herbert Kleber (a 
noted leader in drug prevention research) states: 
Surveys tell us that casual users ... to a great extent are dissuaded 
by fear of being caught if there are very clear consequences once 
they are caught. 
The Navy's "zero tolerance" policy has been in effect for aboutten 
years, but the signal was mixed during most of this time. Whereas the more 
senior enlisted personnel and officers recognized that discovered drug abuse 
would result in an immediate job loss, the younger enlisted force saw "good 
potential" sailors allowed to continue to serve despite first incident drug abuse. 
In 1992, the Navy implemented a "true" zero tolerance policy which leaves no 
room to second-guess the real consequences of drug abuse in the Navy. 
19The Navy plans on continuing a constant random testing model. This was confirmed during 
an interview with Dr. Jules Borack & Mr. James Boyle (NPRDC) by the author on 12 July 1994. 
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c. Command Level Implementation 
Tom Peters, the famous author and organizational management 
consultant, recently st~ted, "great execution still beats great strategy" (Peters, 
1994). Regardless of how effective drug testing policy appears, if the strategy 
is not being fully implemented then the program will become ineffective as a 
deterrent. Consider the command that only tests once a month on the 
Wednesday following the mid-month payday. Though this complies with the 
mandated testing policy (1 0-20 percent each month), the effectiveness is 
questionable. Drug abusers can "game" the system and avoid detection. The 
Navy's Urinalysis Handbook (1992) explains how to effectively conduct the 
program. The handbook recommends testing several smaller quotas rather than 
one large monthly test. It also stresses timing of the drug test, as noted in the 
following excerpt: 
The timing of a test can also be a factor in a successful urinalysis 
program. Test times should remain unpredictable to minimize the 
opportunities for "cheating" on the test and to maximize the 
deterrent effect. When to test can also be a creative 
decision ... the point is to keep the testing schedule as 
unpredictable as possible. (Urinalysis Handbook, 1992) 
The Navy has recently developed a computer-based Drug Policy 
Analysis System (DPAS) that can assist commanding officers in implementing 
an effective and efficient urinalysis testing plan. The system provides the user 
a statistical probability testing tool to ask "what if" type questions (e.g., "What 
if we test every third Monday at a 15 percent monthly rate?"). The program 
contains metabolic rates of various drugs and allows .the operator to select 
many of the system parameters. 
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Two examples of how the DPAS system operates are illustrated below: 
• Example 1: A drug abuser is using LSD approximately eight times per 
month and does not "game" the urinalysis program. The command 
tests at a 20 percent rate. DPAS reveals the average time to 
detection is sixteen months. 
• Example 2: The same drug abuser, described in example ( 1), is 
"gaming" the urinalysis program. The command is still testing at a 20 
percent rate. DPAS reveals the average time to detection increases 
to 25 months. 
The Navy has also developed a Drug Information Presentation 
Model (DIPM). This computerized CD-ROM database system will be discussed 
further in the next chapter, but it can provide extremely useful information on 
each command's drug programs (including urinalysis testing). Inputs from 
several different information systems are utilized to create the DIPM database. 
The data is sorted by UIC and can be used to determine how each command 
in the Navy is implementing its drug testing program by revealing: 
• The monthly rate at which a command is testing. 
• What days (historically) the command has tested (and how often a 
particular day was chosen to conduct the test). 
• How many "drug positives" a command has reported. 
• The disposition of a drug positive individual (i.e., awaiting discharge 
or administratively separated). 
Both effectiveness and efficiency can be enhanced through the power of the 
DPAS/DIPM systems. Twenty-one systems are being introduced at major 
commands and research sites worldwide (e.g., AIRPAC, CNET and NPS). 20 
20The DPAS and DIPM were both demonstrated to the author by Mr. Mark Chipman (NPRDCl 
at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, on 07 September 1994. 
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d. Reliability/Believability of the Drug Test 
For drug testing to be an effective deterrent, potential drug 
abusers must believe in the program's reliability to accurately detect when 
drugs have been used. Without this confidence, the deterrent effect is greatly 
reduced. Bray et al. concluded from the 1992 Worldwide survey that the 
urinalysis program appeared to be positively influencing potential drug abusers 
away from drugs. The survey revealed "drug users were nearly five times more 
likely than nonusers to report that urinalysis reduces the likelihood of their using 
drugs." 
DoD and the Navy have implemented a careful quality control 
program (discussed in Chapter Ill) through AFIP with impressive results. 
However, only about 50 percent of the respondents to the 1992 Worldwide 
survey believe the testing is reliable. This 50 percent figure is actually an 
increase from the 1988 survey, which showed only a 41 percent reliability 
index. The Navy's Drug and Alcohol Program Division (Pers-63) is in the 
process of addressing the "reliability questions" with a soon-to-be released 
video entitled "Without a Doubt. " The film focuses on the reliability of the 
Navy's urinalysis program, describing the rigorous procedures with which the 
samples are screened, including the quality control programs. Pers-63 
describes the purpose of the film as a way to educate Navy personnel on the 
reliability of the drug testing program to enhance its deterrent effect (Interview 
Mahan & Cook, 1994). The film will be released throughout the fleet (probably 
through the DAPA's) sometime during FY-95. 
The reliability /believability factor is one area where the Navy can 
make considerable gains in effectiveness at a relatively low cost. If Navy 
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personnel can be educated on the scientific procedures and reliability of the 
test, one would expect the deterrent factor to increase. 21 
C. STUDIES ON THE MOST EFFECTIVE PREVENTION MODELS 
There are abundant strategies that have been proposed to prevent drug 
abuse. Most of the prevention models have evolved from different etiological 
assumptions concerning drug abuse and various theories of what causes 
behavioral change in an individual. The common theme in much of the 
literature suggests there is not a single "best prevention model" that is effective 
in every situation. The human psyche and personality differences are much too 
complicated for such a simplistic answer. There have been several attempts 
to organize the diverse prevention strategies into specific categories. Tobler 
{ 1986) has organized prevention programs by intervention modality. His five 
categories include: 
1. Programs providing only drug information. 
2. Programs altering the affective (i.e., emotional) psychological status 
of the potential user. 
3. Programs that modify the potential user's relationship with and 
susceptibility to peers. 
4. Programs that combine elements of (1) and (2). 
5. Programs that offer potential users alternatives to drug use. 
21 Reliability/believability can not make up for poor implementation. If the drug testing program 
is being successfully gamed, then personnel will continue to have doubts about the ability of drug 
testing to catch known abusers. In surveys, this may be reported as doubts about the test's 
reliability. 
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Most studies support the conclusion that no single intervention model 
consistently prevents substance abuse. 22 However, a strong consensus is 
beginning to form suggesting a multiple modality approach is the best method 
for an effective prevention model. 23 A single modality approach has, at best, 
a limited impact on reducing drug use (Moskowitz, 1989 & Tobler, 1986). 
Tobler ( 1986) concludes through his quantitative research that the most 
effective prevention models are those which influence personal relationships 
with peers, especially in younger age groups. 
Botvin (Botvin & Tortu, 1988), has reported evidence of success with a 
"Life Skills Training" program. The approach is targeted toward youth but the 
same principles also apply toward older potential. As described in Drug Abuse 
Research Ill (1991), submitted to Congress by The Department of Health and 
Human Services; 
Participants learn the effects of substance abuse and develop 
cognitive-behavioral strategies for coping with anxiety, 
communicating with peers ... enhancing one's self-image, and 
resisting peer pressure to use drugs. 
Drug Abuse Research also finds that effective prevention programs 
"increasingly emphasize the development of interpersonal skills, enhanced self-
perception, and the ability to resist peer pressure." (Drug Research, 1 991 ) . 
However, the narrative warns that the prevention field is still relatively new and 
a decade (or more) of evaluation using "precise, field based methodologies" 
may be required before final conclusions can be reached concerning the 
consistently most effective approach to drug abuse prevention. 




1 . The Cognitive Style Approach 
A cognitive approach to drug abuse prevention involves creating an 
environment where individuals are encouraged to develop new methods and 
mechanisms for problem solving, decision making and coping. The goal is 
behavioral change of an undesired action (e.g., drug abuse). The approach is 
fundamentally an awareness model where participants are challenged to 
question their actions and motives by asking, "Why do I do the things I do?" 
The Navy sponsored a research project (published in 1992) that 
investigated the cognitive style approach as it applied to alcohol and work-
related problems of Navy personnel. 24 The study consisted of a random 
sample of 2,000 junior active duty Navy enlisted personnel.25 The research 
findings support prevention strategies incorporating the cognitive style 
approach (i.e., strategies that incorporate problem solving, decision making, and 
coping skills), especially with young sailors who have displayed identity 
diffusion. 26 
D. THE PREVENT MODEL 
PREVENT uses a multiple modality, Cognitive/Lifestyle and peer 
intervention approach, which Tobler (1986), Botvin (1988), and Jones et al. 
( 1992) indicate shows the most promise of effective intervention for substance 
abuse. The PREVENT model is geared toward the host of high-risk behaviors 
24For more information on the study, see Jones, R.M., Ross, C.N., & Hartmann, B.R., An 
Investigation of Cognitive Style and Alcohol/Work-Related Problems among Naval Personnel, 
published in The Journal of Drug Education, Vol 22, #3, 1992. 
25Final response rate was approximately 900 sailors. 
261dentity diffusion is characterized by no attachment, no meaningful exploration or 
experimentation, and lacking commitment or identity (Marcia, 1983). 
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described in Chapter Ill. Educational aspects of PREVENT also exist (e.g., 
knowledge of personal SAC levels and a segment on the Navy's core values). 
1 . Direct Observational Analysis 
The thesis author attended the week-long PREVENT course in San Diego, 
California during July 1994. The instructor and PREVENT administrators knew 
the purpose of the author's attendance (to gain insight into the PREVENT 
program as part of this thesis research), but the other class participants were 
unaware of the author's background. Since 80 percent of the PREVENT 
attendees take the course as a pure prevention measure, the "stigma" of going 
to a course because of an identified problem is greatly reduced. Class 
participants are unaware if the other members have been referred for an 
incident or are filling a command-directed quota. 
The observational analysis in this study will first consider four positive 
factors which appear to increase PREVENT'S effect:veness. Four negative 
elements, which reduce program effectiveness, will then be discussed. 
a. Positive Factors of PREVENT'S Effectiveness 
The four positive factors of PREVENT's effectiveness include: 
• Addressing multiple high risk addictive behaviors 
• Group setting 
• Course length 
• Mobility 
( 1 ) Multiple High-Risk Addictive Behaviors. The complexity 
of the human personality makes influencing a single negative behavior (e.g., 
drug abuse) extremely difficult. Studies show that if individuals are substance 
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abusers, they are also more likely to be depressed, suicidal, and have other 
serious interpersonal problems (Adams & Overholser, 1988). 27 By addressing 
the root problems rather than just the symptoms, PREVENT is able to create an 
"overlap" phenomenon of effectiveness. In other words, challenging a person's 
belief structure for one high-risk behavior can also positively affect the same 
individual's behavior toward a number of other negative characteristics. 
The overlap phenomenon also helps prevent the problem of 
substituting from one high risk behavior to another (e.g., substituting alcohol 
abuse for drug abuse). It appears that some forms of substituting behaviors are 
occurring in the Navy. Figure 4-4 compares the civilian population with the 
Navy (age 18-25). Note that while the civilian sector shows higher drug abuse 
percentages, the Navy has a statistically significantly higher level of both heavy 
drinking and smoking. 
50%,---------------.-----------------------------~ 
Population 
0 Civilian • Navy 
40% 1--------------___J ................................... 38.-l% .. . 
30% 
20% ............................ "16.9°k ..... . 
Drug abuse Heavy Drinking Smoking 
Figure 4·4: Civilian and Navy Comparisons of Substance Abuse 
Source: 1992 Worldwide Survey 
Note: Standardized Substance Abuse Comparisons For 18·25 Year Olds (past 30 days use) 
27The study also found that alcohol and drug abuse occurred more frequently in suicidal 
patients by as much as 12 times the general population. 
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During the PREVENT course, a young E-3 revealed that he 
was attending the class due to a recent suicide attempt. 28 During some of 
the "self-evaluation" and "believability" exercises, it became apparent that the 
E-3 also engaged in several other "high-risk" behaviors, including drinking 
excessively, smoking, and unprotected sex. The E-3 was in the process of 
being discharged and had just experienced a severe personal crisis. Though 
this case happens to illustrates a number of issues the PREVENT program 
addresses, the example is not considered unique. The point is that drug 
abusers also have other problems that must be addressed in a holistic fashion, 
not segmented into a one-day "Drug Avoidance Program" followed a month 
later by a "Tobacco Cessation Class" or an" Alcohol Responsibility Workshop." 
Human behavior is a complex integration of values, beliefs, and attitudes; it 
does not fragment into such easily discernible pieces. 
Due to the illegal nature and severe consequences of drug 
abuse, PREVENT participants rarely admit or discuss drug use. However, the 
decision making and resistance to addictive practice techniques taught by the 
course directly correlate to the behavioral tendencies associated with drug 
abuse. Many participants changed their attitudes toward several high-risk, 
negative behaviors during the course. 
(2) The Group Setting. PREVENT's group setting appears 
to be especially effective. Throughout the course, group members would 
challenge, identify, and educate each other on various issues ranging from 
addictive personality behaviors (e.g., drinking and nutrition) to stress reduction 
and communication skills (e.g., how to get along with the boss). By inclu9ing 
a larger percentage of personnel who are not attending the class due to "an 
incident," the classroom "norm" for behavior is at a higher plane (as compared 
28Some minor descriptive details of this individual have been altered to provide anonymity. 
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to a group of all incident-related personnel). In fact, some of the most 
meaningful discussion times occurred during the class breaks. The synergy 
created by the group setting creates an atmosphere of positive lifestyle 
changing decisions. 
(3) The Course Length. With tight resources and the 
Navy's continual search to reduce training time, this may not be a popular item, 
but it appears that the week-long course adds significantly to PREVENT's 
effectiveness. To adequately impact behavioral change, participants must be 
willing to challenge themselves and face issues that have been forming in their 
belief system most of their life. The group setting becomes most effective 
starting about the third day of class. It takes time for honesty and trust to 
develop between the PREVENT facilitator and the other class members. 
Additionally, the amount of information covered requires sufficient time to 
comprehend and incorporate into one's internal belief structure. Shortening the 
course will reduce the "Cognitive/Lifestyle" impact and step back into the single 
modality approach that Tobler (1986) and others described as the least 
effective form of prevention. 
(4) Mobility of PREVENT. PREVENT has literally been 
taught around the world. Course facilitators have even deployed aboard naval 
vessels to teach the class. The instructor of the PREVENT class this author 
attended had just returned from a WESTPAC cruise where the course was 
offered over fifteen times to almost every junior enlisted sailor on the ship. 
With the Navy's operational tempo, it is critical for the PREVENT program to be 
a mobile course. An additional "overlap" of effectiveness is created as young 
sailors on an extended deployment and away from home for the first time are 
taught skills of resisting "high-risk behavior" (almost a definition of "liberty-call" 
during a ship's port visit). 
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b. Negative Factors of PREVENT's Effectiveness 
The four negative factors of PREVENT's effectiveness include: 
• Funding 
• Lack of Class segregation (Officer/Enlisted) 
• Facilitator contractual considerations 
• Ignoring personal financial issues 
( 1) Funding of PREVENT. Most of the discussion 
concerning PREVENT funding will occur in the next Chapter as an efficiency 
issue; however, the effectiveness of the course is also negatively affected. 
The average $3.5 million PREVENT contract is not fixed. The annual budget 
fluctuates throughout the year depending on the number of classes major 
claimant commands request. Additionally, the counterdrug funds from N-51 5 
may not be distributed until midway through the fiscal year (depending on other 
requirements). Funding for the program actually comes from many sources. 
This fragmented and variable funding makes program planning extremely 
difficult. The results can decrease effectiveness through loss of courses and 
facilitators (as evidenced by the FY -94 cut of one million dollars). 
As funding becomes increasingly constrained, PREVENT 
enrollment also drops. PREVENT attendance reached an all-time low during 
FY-94 (approximately 35,000 graduates). Resources also reached a new low, 
falling below the projected $3.3 millen mark to approximately $2.8 million. 
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Questions regarding the cut usually point to the massive reductions DoD 
received during FY -94 in counterdrug budgets and the Navy's resulting share 
of the reduction. 29 
(2) Lack of Segregation (Officer/Enlisted). Though 
PREVENT can be tailored for segregated groups, the standard course includes 
all ranks and rates. The effectiveness of the course is reduced primarily 
because of the rank and chain of command barriers, which run contrary to the 
desired model of peer intervention and self-revealing openness. This has not 
been a historical problem, since only about two percent of PREVENT attendees 
are officers. However, it appears that combining division officers with their 
enlisted troops to openly discuss addictive practices and behaviors (from 
depression and drinking to high-risk sexual activity) constrains the openness 
that an effective group setting requires. 
(3) Facilitator Contractual Considerations. The PREVENT 
instructors are part-time employees under contract from the University of 
Arizona. The employee pay scale is an hourly wage ranging from approximately 
$9 to $14 dollars an hour. A college degree is not required, though many 
facilitators have at least some advanced education or training. The part-time 
status means that no benefits (such as health insurance) are tied to the job, and 
the facilitator's income fluctuates as PREVENT funds are reduced (e.g., if a 
class is canceled, the facilitator is not paid). 
29These budget discussions occurred at three levels within DoD during personal interviews by 
the author with representatives from each department (see Interviews in reference): 
- OSD Department of Defense Drug Enforcement Policy & Support 
- (USDP/DEP&S-DR) DCNO (Plans, Policy, & Operations) Counterdrug Branch (N-515) 
Bureau of Naval Personnel: Navy Drug & Alcohol Program (Pers-63) 
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The facilitator who instructed the class was outstanding. 
But it was also obvious he could not work a "part-time" job five days a week 
as a PREVENT facilitator and still support a family. Consequently, this talented 
counselor resigned shortly after the July class to take a full-time position with 
another counseling program. Though this is an isolated incident, it reveals a 
weakness in the contract. Specific educational and benefit requirements 
(including the possibility for full-time positions) should be established in the 
contract to ensure that high-quality facilitators are maintained. These 
requirements may cost more, but the facilitators play the key role in the 
courses' success and their expertise must be preserved. 
(4) PREVENT and Personal Finances. PREVENT ignores the 
personal financial management issues that are a part of a personal responsibility 
paradigm. A segment dealing with the personal responsibility of meeting 
financial obligations and avoiding oppressive debt is a very real need in the fleet 
(especially when the spending is addictive in nature) . If commanding officers 
were asked to itemize those areas that daily provide the greatest challenge to 
their junior enlisted personnel, it would probably be the lack of personal finance 
skills and the constant indebtedness junior personnel face. 30 Though the 
argument could be made that personal finance has little to do with a PREVENT 
curriculum, an equally convincing debate could be waged showing a correlation 
between poor personal responsibility skills and severe financial problems. 
Though beyond the scope of this study, it would be interesting to note how 
many personnel being discharged for drug abuse and other high risk behavioral 
problems also suffer from poor personal financial management. The financial 
30 Although this is a subjective statement, the author confirmed this problem during several 
interviews. In discussing this issue with the PREVENT director (Dr. Hartmann), she confirmed that 
the Chief of Chaplains and several Commanding Officers had echoed the same concern. 
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theme would fit nicely into the overall PREVENT model of decision making by 
again emphasizing responsibility for one's choices. 31 
2. The Effectiveness of PREVENT 
The question for the Navy has become, "Is PREVENT an effective means 
of drug abuse prevention?" The contractor for PREVENT has been tracking the 
program's effectiveness for over eight years (before PREVENT, statistics were 
maintained on the NADSAP program). Chapter Ill briefly discussed the 
contractor's method of measuring effectiveness through pre and post 
questionnaires and follow-up surveys of graduates. The evaluation also 
involves randomly selecting Navy personnel who have not attended PREVENT 
and measuring their high-risk behaviors through surveys. 
The published results of these measures of effectiveness are impressive. 
Consider the following program outcomes (PREVENT Information Guide, 1994): 
• Approximately 80 percent of the course participants report using 
alcohol. Within ninety days of completing the course, 40 percent of 
the graduates had decreased their alcohol use. This decrease in use 
was maintained over the year following course completion. 
• Course graduates are less than half as likely to have a substance 
abuse related incident when compared to other service members. 
• Supervisors report significant and consistently higher performance 
ratings among personnel who complete the course. 
• · Drug related incidents decreased from 3 percent to less than 1 percent 
and disciplinary actions were reduced from 7 percent to less than 3 
percent. 
31 Properly handling one's finances is becoming more important for military personnel. The 
1992 Worldwide survey contained a new section entitled "Gambling in the Military." The Navy 
displayed the greatest prevalence toward serious gambling problems (as compared to the other 
Services). 
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• Service members report that the application of the adaptability skills 
and problem solving strategies has enhanced their military readiness 
and overall quality of life. 
Results from the pre and post test taken by the class attendees are 
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Figure 4-5: PREVENT Graduates' Increased Awareness 
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Figure 4-6: PREVENT Graduates' Planned Changes 
Source: PREVENT Fact Sheet, 1993 
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Figure 4-7 compares PREVENT graduates to Navy personnel who have 
not attended the course. Though the substance being measured is alcohol, the 
same type of addictive, high-risk behavior is strongly associated with drug 
abuse. "Heavy drinkers" are defined as people who drink on at least one 
occasion a week, and have five or more drinks per occasion (Worldwide 
Survey, 1992). 
PREVENT versus Non-PREVENT 
Percent of Heavy Drinkers 
15%. 
0°k~--------~--------~~--------J Before Prevent 6 Months Control 
After PREVENT Group 
Figure 4-7: Comparing PREVENT and Non-PREVENT Attendees 
Source: PREVENT Fact Sheet, 1993 
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Figure 4-8 displays what PREVENT students think about the course. 
Over the past two years, 60 percent of the graduates rated the course as 
outstanding or above average. This statement alone is impressive 
considering that the primary course objective is to change fundamental 
attitudes and behaviors of class participants, many of whom had a negative 
attitude toward attending the course (whether forced to attend through a 





Figure 4-8: PREVENT Graduates' Impressions 








E. DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION IN THE U.S. AIR FORCE (USAF) 
Drug abuse within the Air Force has historically been lower than the 
other military services. Table 4-3 shows the unadjusted DoD rates of drug 
abuse over the past decade for each Service. 32 Figure 4-8, on the next page, 
graphically illustrates the USN/USAF comparison (using the "Past 30 Days" 
data). 
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198(} 33.7 43.2 14.5 23.4 30.7 39.4 37.7 48.0 
1982 16.2 28.1 11.9 16.4 26.2 32.4 20.6 29.9 
. . 
.·... ·. 
)985 10.3 15.9 4.5 7.2 11.5 16.6 9.9 14.7 
. 1988 5.4 11.3 2.1 3.8 6.9 11.8 4.0 7.8 
1992 4.0 6.6 1.2 2.3 3.9 7.7 5.6 10.7 
Table 4-3: DoD Historical Drug Abuse Trends (Past 30 Days/Past 12 Months) 
Source: 1992 Worldwide Survey 
32Unadjusted estimates are sometimes referred to as "raw" estimates. They do not take into 
account sociodemographic differences between the Services. Unadjusted rates do not allow for 
strict comparisons between the Services. 
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USN versus USAF HISTORICAL DRUG ABUSE 
(Any Drug Use in the Past 30 days) 
Percent 
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Figure 4-9: USN versus USAF Historical Rate of Drug Abuse 
Source: 1992 Worldwide Survey 
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Even after adjusting for sociodemographic differences such as age, race, 
education, and marital status, the Air Force has a statistically significantly lower 
rate of drug use than the other military components. Figure 4-9 illustrates the 
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Figure 4·1 0: Service Comparison of Drug Abuse (Adjusted) 
Source: 1 992 Worldwide Survey 
. 
33 Adjusted rates take into account the sociodemographic differences between the military 
services. Using regression-based standardized procedures, the adjusted rates allow comparisons 
between Services. The adjusted rate reveals the drug use prevalence that would be expected if 
each Service had the same DoD distribution profile (concerning sex, age, education, race/ethnicity, 
and marital status). 
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The most recent Worldwide Survey (1992) makes special note of the 
"striking difference" in drug abuse in the lower pay grades (E 1-E3) between the 
Air Force and the other Services. Figure 4-10 depicts the adjusted rates for the 
younger enlisted military members (typically the highest drug abusers) for each 
Service. 
E1-E3 Drug Use During the Past 12 Months (1992) 
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Figure 4·11: Service Comparison of E1-E3 Drug Abusers (Adjusted) 
Source: 1992 Worldwide Survey 
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1 . Effective Elements to Drug Prevention in the USAF 
Looking at statistics alone reveals something is very different in the 
USAF as compared to the other Services. If one definition of effectiveness is 
"lower abuse rates," then the question becomes: "how has the Air Force 
maintained a more effective level of drug abuse prevention than the other DoD 
military components?" This is especially perplexing when one considers that 
the Air Force historically has only conducted random urinalysis testing at an 
annual rate of 30 percent. 34 This is the lowest rate of any Service (the Army, 
Navy, and USMC all test at a rate above 100 percent).35 Through various 
interviews, research, and analysis, this thesis benchmarks four keys which 
appear to influence the lower rate of drug abuse in the Air Force. 
• Historically tighter drug abuse policy 
• Quality of recruit/psychological profile 
• Proactive law enforcement 
• Quality of life 
a. Historically Tighter Drug Abuse Policy 
In a recent interview with the Air Force department responsible for 
demand reduction policies (Darby & Herdman, 1994), the tighter USAF drug 
abuse policy was discussed as a key factor for lower Air Force abuse rates.36 
34For a thorough analysis of the Air Force drug testing program, see Doster & Ross, An 
Analysis of the Effectiveness of the Air Force Drug Testing Program and Four Potential 
Modifications, {Thesis}, Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base,.OH, 
1993. 
351n mid 1992, the Air Force was directed to increase the annual percentage of its population 
randomly tested from 30 to 60 percent (Doster & Ross, 1993). 
36The USAF separation policy was confirmed via phone call to Major Rich Cervetti, USAF, Air 
Force Enlisted Separations & Retirements Branch (DPXER), by the author, 24 October 1994. 
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Since the early 1980s, the USAF has discharged virtually all individuals 
identified as drug abusers (E-1 and above) for all drug use except marijuana. 
Those lower pay grades testing positive for THC could be retained in the 
Service in some special circumstances. However, a "true" zero tolerance policy 
was instituted by 1988, and essentially all USAF personnel (E-1 and above) 
found positive for any illegal drug (including THC) were immediately processed 
for separation. This was tighter than any other military services and four years 
before the Navy went to a "true" zero tolerance·policy for all pay grades. 
b. Quality of Recruit/Psychological Profile 
The quality of the Air Force recruit and the psychological profile 
of USAF personnel are tied together as contributing factors to a lower USAF 
abuse rate. The Research Triangle Institute (RTI) reported in 1989 that both 
sociodemographic and psychological variables are important in explaining why 
individuals abuse drugs (Bray et al., 1989). The Air Force has the most 
restrictive entrance aptitude standards of any Service (Eitel berg, 1988), 
resulting in consistently higher enlisted ASVAB scores (as compared to the 
other Services). 37 DoD demographic surveys reveal that over 54 percent of 
the USAF enlisted personnel have some college credit toward an advanced 
degree, twice the level of any other Service (Selected Manpower Statistics, 
1993). Air Force regulations also contain a policy prohibiting the enlistment or 
appointment of personnel who have ever used drugs (AFR 30-2, 1986). 38 
37The milit"ry uses the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) to assess the 
cognitive aptitude of enlisted personnel. For further reference, see Adaptability Screening for the 
Armed Forces, edited by Trent and Laurence, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force 
Management and Personnel), 1993. 
38The specific regulation (AFR 30-2 C1 Chapter 3, para 17b) states that in some situations 
waivers may be requested. 
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Table 4-4 graphically illustrates the historical dominance of the Air Force 
"recruit quality" factor: 
PERCENT WITH.HIGH SCHOOL .. a:v.,._. 
DIPLOMA 1991 1992 19-9'3 1994 ·a3;;•93 
All Services 97 99 95 96 94 
Army 98 100 95 95 93 
Navy 96 98 94 95 92 
Air Force 99 99 99 99 99 
Marine Corps 98 99 97 95 96 
All Services 72 74 67 68 61 
Army 78 78 66 66 59 
Navy 62 66 64 63 55 
Air Force 85 85 79 80 77 
Marine Corps 67 70 66 68 61 
···•••t:=~~ATEGO~~'_• .. ~Y······· ......................................... , •••..•.. \.~9•1•••••••• ·········~·~~~······· 
All Services 0.5 0.2 0.8 0.7 4.8 
Army 0.9 0.4 2.2 1.9 5.7 
Navy 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 
Air Force 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.7 
Marine Corps 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 
1 High quality recruits have high school diplomas or the equivalent and scored in the top 50 
percentiles on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). 
2 Category IV recruits scored between the 1Oth and 30th percentiles on the AFOT. Those 
scoring below the 1Oth percentile are not eligible for service. 
Table 4-4: Recruit Quality Measures (in Percent) 
Source: Reported in Navy Times per DoD, 14 November 1994 
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Perhaps the most important factor in the quality debate is the 
psychological difference of the recruits that complete initial basic training. In 
the mid 1970s, the Air Force began a highly successful psychological 
evaluation procedure known as the Air Force Medical Evaluation Test (AFMET). 
AFMET uses a psychological screening process to administratively separate 
USAF recruits likely to attrite (Fielder, 1990). I dar and Scaramozzino ( 1992) 
describe the process as a three-phased model that uses self-reports of life 
history, a standardized mental health inventory, and a mental health evaluation 
by a psychologist or psychiatrist (in the final phase). 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the Navy began a program 
in 1991, modeled after the USAF program, called the Navy-AFMET (N-AFMET). 
The Navy's early findings reveal the N-AFMET program has provided a "very 
positive effect" resulting in a "significant decrease in attrition" (ldar & 
Scaramozzino, 1992). Interestingly enough, a significant proportion (36%) of 
those attrited in the N-AFMET screening process were diagnosed with some 
variation of alcohol or drug related diagnosis. Neither the Army nor Marine 
Corp use this type of screening process. By identifying and screening out new 
recruits with adverse psychological problems, the Air Force has been able to 
ensure a higher quality recruit who is less likely to abuse drugs. 39 
One potential consequence of the Air Force screening process is 
a recruit with a different psychological belief system. Hildebrandt found 
evidence that the psychological belief system of the USAF member may in fact 
be different than the other Services, and the Navy in particular (Hildebrandt, 
1994). She discovered, through legit analysis of the 1992 Worldwide Survey, 
that USAF personnel are "significantly more likely to believe in the harmful 
39The 1 992 Worldwide survey compensates for educational level differences between the 
Services in its "adjusted" percentages. This helps to explain the USAF rise in abuse rates when 
the sociodemographic adjustment is made. However, the AFMET screening process is not 
accounted for in the survey adjusted figures. 
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effects of drugs." In the 1989 RTI study referred to earlier (Bray et al.), the 
results indicate that belief in the harmful effect of drugs is an important 
predictor of drug abuse. By recruiting a higher quality individual and using an 
active recruit screening process, the Air Force may get young people with a 
different psychological profile than the other Services. This difference probably 
plays an important role in the Air Force's lower abuse rates. 
c. Proactive Law Enforcement 
The Air Force has a strong, proactive law enforcement 
organization called the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).40 
Created in 1948, AFOSI is comparable in scope and mission to the Naval 
Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). However, NCIS agents are civilian federal 
investigators who are employed by the Navy (similar to FBI or Secret Service 
agents). 41 Approximately two-thirds of AFOSI's agents are active duty or 
reserve USAF personnel. There are several advantages to using military 
personnel, especially when undercover operations are being conducted. Agents 
with military backgrounds or expertise can easily merge into a command 
climate suspected of having a drug problem. With its military units, AFOSI 
conducts two highly effective programs in its internal fight against drugs, the 
Source,Program and the Undercover Agent Program. 
40Significant portions of this section are based on a personal interview with Special Agent, 
Captain James L. Weingartner, USAF/OSI by the author on 14 & 28 October 1994. 
41 Phone interview with Mr. Joe Orrigo, NCIS, Head, Counterdrug/Special Operations and 
Criminal Intelligence (Code 0023BNI by the author on 03 November 1994. Mr. Orrigo confirmed 
that all NCIS counterdrug special agents are civilian. 
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( 1) The Source Program. When an individual tests positive 
for drug abuse through a routine urinalysis test, AFOSI is notified 
immediately---often before the command or individual. AFOSI is given the 
opportunity to contact the drug abuser and determine if they are willing to help 
identify the drug supplier and other drug abusers. Sometimes an undercover 
operation will be initiated with the aid of the source. The source program has 
reaped significant benefits. In one publicized operation (Global Reliance, 
Mar/Apr 1991 ), a young airman was stopped by local police while driving a 
marked government vehicle in an area known as an operating district for crack 
cocaine dealers. Since the vehicle did not have any official business in the 
area, the airman was required to participate in a command directed urinalysis, 
which proved to be positive for cocaine. The airman was brought into the 
source program, and two confidential informants were used to begin a three-
month undercover investigation. The operation resulted in the arrest of 12 mid-
level cocaine dealers. A secondary case was generated that resulted in the 
arrest of an additional five dealers. 
(2) The Undercover Agent Program. When civilian drug 
dealers sell drugs to military members or distribute them to military installations, 
current DoD directives allow military investigative agencies to conduct 
undercover narcotics operations (Global Reliance, Mar/Apr 1991 ). 
Working with local police departments, AFOSI aggressively 
attacks the drug problem at the off-base supply points. In a seven-month 
undercover operation in Tacoma, Washington, AFOSI and local law 
enforcement officials arrested 40 drug dealers, some of whom were identified 
as gang members. Attacking the local supply roots makes dealing with Air 
Force personnel very risky. In the Tacoma case, the local drug district was 
characterized by law enforcement personnel as a "ghost town." The 
distributors had become extremely cautious in selling drugs to USAF personnel. 
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Undercover operations are also aggressively conducted 
internally within the Air Force command structure. AFOSI Special Agents will 
pose as legitimate command personnel or work through informants in a unit 
suspected of having a drug problem. The commander is usually working with 
the undercover agent, but his approval (or knowledge) is not required. A case 
at Malmstrom AFB, Montana illustrates how an AFOSI informant (a female 
sergeant) helped to uncover an airman who offered to buy cocaine for her 
(Global Reliance, Sep/Oct 1990). 
In an overseas operation, local NCIS officials suspected a 
possible drug problem on a Navy base as a result of several positive urinalysis 
tests. NCIS did not have the manpower nor technical resources available for 
an undercover operation so AFOSI was asked for assistance. The Navy base 
commander was not convinced his command had a serious drug problem, but 
agreed to a weekend undercover operation with the stipulation that sailors 
attached to ships currently in port would not be targeted. AFOSI agents made 
over 15 drug related arrests in one weekend. Of special note, agents actually 
working the sting operation reported that many more arrests could have been 
made if the "no sell to the fleet sailors" rule had not been established (Interview 
with Weingartner, 1994). 
Proactive use of military agents and informants to identify 
drug abusers and shut down local suppliers makes AFOSI unique. Fighting drug 
abuse has been a top priority of AFOSI for many years. Through their 
diligence, AFOSI has made drug abuse in the Air Force an exceptionally risky 
endeavor. 
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d. Quality of Life 
Quality of life may play an important role when considering 
psychological factors of drug abuse. Bray and others have found that the 
relationship between drug {and alcohol} abuse and the military workplace is 
extremely complex (Bray et al., 1990). However, using regression analysis on 
the 1988 Worldwide survey, Bray's studies determined the following: 
... certain {unfavorable} conditions of military life are related to 
greater involvement in use of drugs and alcohol. Work-related 
stress, region, and family status are significant predictors of both 
drug use and heavy drinking. 
This assertion tends to support the hypothesis that those who sense a greater 
discontent with their present lifestyle are more likely to use drugs. While 
quality of life can be a difficult feature to quantify directly, associated factors 
can be used as substitute measures. One such measure is the reenlistment 
rates of enlisted personnel. Since each military service uses the same pay 
scale, and most DoD policy directives affect military personnel in approximately 
the same manner, reenlistment rates can provide a relatively strong indication 
of job satisfaction and the quality of life (based on a member's decision to 
remain on active duty). Table 4-5 reveals the Air Force consistently shows 
higher reenlistment rates than the other Services. 
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.. 
.. I fY USA (%1 USN {%l. ···usMct%1··· USAF(%). 
1987 41.8 65.1 53.2 83.9 
1988 47.1 63.9 50.7 92.0 
1989 48.2 67.2 47.7 89.2 
1990 28.7 68.0 54.7 77.6 
1991 75.4 69.2 47.5 81.2 
1992·. 69.5 69.6 43.8 82.8 
1993 71.6 67.1 46.6 84.0 
Table 4-5: Reenlistment Rates (FY87-FY93) 
Source: DoD Selected Military Manpower Statistics, FY -93 
Another factor affecting perceived quality of life is separation from 
families. The results of a 1992 survey released in August 1994 reported that 
Navy and Marine Corp families were separated more often than their 
counterparts in the other Services, with the Air Force spending the least time 
away from their families (DoD Survey, 1992). If quality of life decreases with 
an increase in stress, and one assumes that separation from families increases 
stress at work, then Hildebrant's log it analysis becomes relevant. The analysis 
demonstrates that increased stress at work is a highly significant estimator of 
drug abuse (Hildebrandt, 1994). The DoD survey also showed that junior 
enlisted members (E1-E3) spent the most time away from their families. Since 
this lower pay grade group is also the most likely to abuse drugs, the influence 
of stress can produce a compounding effect. 
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In Bray's research on drugs in the workplace (Bray et al., 1990), 
two specific recommendations address the family support and stress issue: 
• The military should examine its policies on spousal accompaniment to 
provide the stability of family support whenever practical. 
• The military should evaluate the stress-producing conditions of certain 
military jobs and intensify its efforts toward helping military personnel 
effectively cope with stress by offering additional stress management 
instruction. 
A final comment on the quality of life question is an observation 
made while gathering data for this thesis. This research entailed interviewing 
dozens of individuals from different branches of service and at various levels 
throughout DoD (many who are directly responsible for drug abuse policy and 
implementation). In many of the interviews, interviewees were asked what 
they felt was a major factor contributing to the Air Force lower drug abuse 
rates. In every instance where the question was asked, one of the responses 
included a statement that the Air Force provided a better "quality of life" for its 
enlisted personnel (compared with the other Services). Though this is a highly 




V. MEASURING THE EFFICIENCY OF DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION 
This chapter focuses on the efficiency of the Navy, s drug abuse 
prevention programs. Normally, economists view efficiency as a relationship 
between the value of the ends and the value of the means (Heyne, 1993). The 
concept of "marginalism" is important as marginal benefits and marginal costs 
are compared, often leading to today,s well known evaluation technique known 
simply as "Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA)." This· thesis does not attempt to 
perform a BCA of drug abuse prevention; instead, efficiency is narrowly defined 
as it relates to the efficient process of providing resources (both monetary and 
personnel) to the Navy,s drug prevention efforts. 
The chapter begins by looking at drug abuse prevention program funding. 
Drug testing is briefly considered in reference to a current DoD initiative to 
consolidate the military drug testing laboratories. The PREVENT program,s 
funding is then analyzed, particularly the efficiency elements of timeliness, 
adequacy and sources of funding. Other "wellness" type programs are 
mentioned with attention given to resource sponsorship, major claimancy, and 
program manager status. Drug prevention in community awareness programs 
is reviewed as it pertains to the Navy, with comments regarding how efficient 
DoD is in using its drug prevention resources. Lastly, manpower efficiency (and 
effectiveness) is assessed, particularly as it relates to the DAPA program. 
A. DRUG ABUSE PREVENTION PROGRAM FUNDING 
All Navy and Marine Corps Counterdrug (CD) resources have been 
consolidated. within DCNO (Plans, Policy, and Operations) Counterdrug Branch 
(N-515). As Table 5-1 reveals, the Navy's Demand Reduction budget line is 
relatively small when compared to the total Navy CD budget. 
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j DoN CounterDrug Budgst Summar/ 
Demand Reduction2 
Navy 27:..7 ........ . 
Marine Corps 
TOTAL: 
..... . ..... 
Total CD Budget 
Marine Corps 
TOTAL: 
Table 5-1: DoD Counterdrug Budget Summary ($ Millions) 
Source: DCNO (N-515) Counterdrug Spreadsheet, 1994 
Notes: 1 . Approximate budget lines as of July 1994 
3.7 
15.9 
2. Includes project lines (Navy) #8351 /8352/8993 and 
(USMC) #8353/8354/8995 
.··· 
The Navy's Counterdrug Branch received an unanticipated reduction of 
approximately $50 million in FY -94. This cut was spread-out among the 
various project lines. While it is difficult to account for how much of the 
reduction actually went to each resource sponsor, the CD branch did explain 
that drug testing and the urinalysis program was given the highest priority (i.e., 
other project lines were cut before drug testing). (Interview with Weisberg, 
1994). 
1. The Drug Testing Program 
Even though the urinalysis program is given the highest priority in 
resource funding, the Navy and DoD continue to search for ways to increase 
the efficiency of the program in order to save resources. The total cost of 
processing a urine specimen is approximately $7 per sample (Interview with 
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Davis, 1994). In order to increase efficiency while reducing direct and indirect 
overhead costs associated with testing millions of samples each year, DoD is 
considering consolidating all of the military drug testing facilities. 
a. DoD Drug Lab Consolidation42 
In 1992 the DoD IG recommended that the military go from nine 
to four drug testing laboratories to increase cost efficiencies in the urinalysis 
program. DoD has directed the Services to enter into a three month joint pilot 
program at Tripier Army Medical Center (beginning in October 1994) to study 
the feasibility of consolidating the laboratories. If the military labs are 
consolidated, drug testing would be conducted on a regional basis. The 
tentative plan is to locate the labs at the following sites (the lead Service at 
each lab is highlighted in brackets): 
• Brooks AFB, San Antonio Texas {USAF} 
• Fort Meade, Maryland {USA} 
• San Diego, CA {USN} 
• Jacksonville, FL {USN} 
The consolidation issue is sensitive within DoD. Several factors 
besides strict cost efficiencies are being debated, including: 
• How many drugs will each sample be tested for? 
• · Will the Services continue to test at different rates or will they be 
regulated on how much/often to test? 
42Much of the information in this section was obtained during an interview with LCDR George 
Davis, Branch Head, Detection & Deterrence (Pers-63), Washington D.C., by the author on 08 
August 1994. 
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• Is contracted drug testing cheaper (with the same quality) as 
compared to testing in DoD labs? 
• Will individual Services have the same accessibility to the consolidated 
or contracted labs? 
• What policy will be used to determine when a sample is tested 
(concerning the damage and general condition of the sample when it 
arrives at the lab)? 
Each of the Services vary somewhat in the specifics of how urinalysis samples 
are tested and the administration of the programs. The cost efficiencies and 
trade-offs that consolidated/contracted labs provide is an issue requiring greater 
study and evaluation. 
2. The PREVENT Program 
The PREVENT resource sponsor is N-1 (via SUPERS). As explained in 
Chapter IV, the funds for the $3.5 million PREVENT contract come from many 
different activities including: 
• SUPERS 63 
• DCNO (N-515) Drug Demand Reduction Office 
• Major Claimants43 
• Local Commands 
43 As an example of Major Claimant funding, CNET provided about $400K in FY -94 to the 
PREVENT contract (Interview with Massengill, 1994). 
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The Drug and Alcohol Program Management Activity (DAPMA) controls the 
PREVENT funds, though the contract is actually administered by local 
Counseling and Assistance Centers (CAAC) (Pers-63 Point Paper, 1993). 44 
The inefficiencies involved in funding PREVENT are summarized in the 
following three areas: 
• Multiple resource providers 
• Flexible budget 
• Drug prevention verses other "wellness" programs 
Working together, these deficiencies create an inefficient allocation of resources 
which also decreases the effectiveness of the PREVENT program (as discussed 
in Chapter IV). 
a. Multiple Resource Providers 
As Pers-63 explains, "the Bureau of Naval Personnel does not have 
enough funds to accommodate the demand for PREVENT and {major} claimants 
and individual commands {must} augment the funding" (Pers-63 Point Paper, 
1993).45 The myriad funding possibilities reduces the efficiency of the 
PREVENT funding flow. When funding is short, the DAPMA must "shop" for 
a resource supplier, cut funds from another budget line, or cancel classes. The 
PREVENT contractor rarely knows from quarter to quarter what level of funding 
to expect or how many PREVENT classes to schedule. 
44DAPMA is a support detachment from SUPERS 63 and is located in San Diego, CA. It was 
originally formed in 1985 as the NADSAP Management Office (NMO). DAPMA provides a central 
point as the "eyes and ears" for Level I and Level II programs. It manages the worldwide drug and 
alcohol related contracts. (Pers-63 point paper, 1993). 
45Pers-63 reported the fleet demand for NADSAP/PREVENT reached a record high of 70,000 
confirmed requests in FY-92 (Pers-63 Point Paper). 
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--------- __________________ ____. 
The adequacy and variability of funding is not a new problem to 
NADAP. Findings in a 1982 Navy audit report of the Navy and Marine Corps 
alcohol and drug abuse programs found: 
The adequacy of funding and staffing varies {at the local 
counseling facilities}. No direct relationship exist between 
available resources and potential users ... Funds are passed through 
major claimants to local commands and are difficult to trace to the 
CAAC activity level. .. CAACs and most NASAPs depend primarily 
on the priority assigned by the commanding officer for funding 
and staffing resources. (Naval Audit Service, 1982) 
The PREVENT budget suffers from the same type of resource allocation 
problems that earlier drug and alcohol abuse programs faced. 
b. Flexible Budget 
The flexible budget problem is closely associated with having too 
many resource providers. Because PREVENT is not a fixed contract, the level 
of funding fluctuates with each quarter and the required class schedule cannot 
be fixed. For example, the PREVENT contractor is currently operating (as of 22 
November 1994) on funding for the first quarter FY-95, but has not received 
funding information for the second quarter, scheduled to begin in just six 
weeks.46 The contractor's obligations to both the Navy and the PREVENT 
employees (e.g., site coordinators and facilitators) are difficult to manage given 
the inefficient method by which funding is provided. 
461nformation provided the author after his phone request from the PREVENT contract director 
(Dr. B.A. Hartmann, Ph.D.), on 21 November 1994. 
94 
c. Drug Prevention Verses Other "Wei/ness" Programs 
The PREVENT program addresses at least ten different high-
risk/behavioral issues, with drug abuse being a relatively "minor" topic. 
However, the entire funding of PREVENT comes through the drug prevention 
budget line. Those responsible for the CD budget question the validity of 
funding a program which addresses so many other issues (besides drug abuse). 
Fragmented budgets in the "wellness" type programs (e.g., tobacco cessation, 
HIV/AIDS awareness, and sexual harassment education to name just a few), 
encourages infighting as to whose office should fund which programs. 
However, while budgets are fragmented, potential course attendees have 
complex personalities and overlapping behaviors. The multi-modality approach 
to high-risk behavior has been illustrated as the best form of drug prevention, 
but the Navy funds its "wellness" programs through fragmented budget lines 
including multiple resource sponsors and program managers. When 
consolidated courses like PREVENT are introduced, the fragmented budget 
process hinders efficient use of Navy resources. A consolidated budget, 
grouping all the "wellness" type programs together, should provide stability and 
a more efficient allocation of resources. Centralized program management 
responsibilities also help preclude redundant funding, creating additional 
efficiencies. 
(1) Zero-Based Training and Education Review (ZBT&ER). 
In 1993, the Navy completed a comprehensive Zero-Based Training and 
Education Review (ZBT &ER). The stated purpose of the review was: 
... to examine Navy shore-based training and education ... to ensure 
that the training infrastructure is appropriately sized and focused 
to support a smaller, more capable Navy and to ensure that Navy 
training and education will effectively employ the doctrine of 
... "From the Sea." (ZBT&ER, 1993) 
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Table 5-2 illustrates how the ZBT&ER describes the sponsorship, claimancy, 
and management responsibilities of various wellness programs. 
Selected Training Programs ,·. Resource·'·•· Major ' .. ~ .. ,., .. ',., .. , .... 
., .... ....... ,., ... 
/· 
(WeHness Oriented) Sponsor Claimant··· Mlirtager · .. .·· 
PREVENT N1 SUPERS SUPERS 
DAPA N1 CNET/SUPERS CNET/SUPERS 
HIV/AIDS SUM ED SUM ED CNET 
Victim Assistance N1 SUPERS SUPERS 
Rape Awareness 
Financial Management N1 SUPERS SUPERS 
Physical Readiness N1 CNET CNET 
Smoking Cessation 
Standards of Conduct Office of OGC OGC 
Ethics General Council 
(OGCl 
General Military Training N1,N09S CNET/SUPERS CNET/SUPERS 
(Includes some "wellness" 
type training) 
Table 5-2: Sponsors and Claimancy of Various Wellness Type Programs 
Source: ZBT&ER, 1993 and Pers-63 
The ZBT&RE report discusses many of the programs in Table 5-2 
within the context of its "leadership development program." It finds 
"considerable duplication of effort" across the programs, with only "limited 
measures of effectiveness" in place to evaluate the programs. The ZBT&ER 
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specifically discusses the NADAP programs, making the following 
recommendation and rationale/justification statements: 
RECOMMENDATION: Designate CNO N7 as the single resource sponsor 
for all shore-based education and training. 
RATIONALE/JUSTIFICATION: 
Of the General Military Training (GMT) programs ... N 1 is the 
resource sponsor for ... Drug and Alcohol Program Advisor (DAPA) 
training ... CNET/BUPERS are the major claimants and program 
managers for DAPA training. Placing the resourcing and funding 
control for ... the drug and alcohol programs in a single area will 
provide standardization and consistency in program content and 
delivery, provided appropriate funding is realized. Resourcing 
would be under the single official most responsible for supporting 
the programs, and management of funds and execution would be 
under subordinates to that official. It would also place the major 
claimant and program manager in a position to be the sole and 
total provider of standardized training aids to be used by local 
commands in conducting General Navy Training. (ZBT&ER, 1993) 
Aligning the well ness programs under a single resource sponsor, who is also 
the major claimant and program manager, could provide a coordinated and more 
efficient management for all the programs. 
3. Community Awareness Programs 
The federal government has sponsored drug prevention community 
awareness programs for a number of years. The Department of Education and 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development are two principle players 
in the government's efforts to help States reduce drug abuse. In 1 ~93, 
congress specifically tasked DoD with developing pilot outreach programs to 
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help in the nation's drug demand reduction efforts. The conference report for 
the National Defense Authorization Act (FY -93) states: 
The Secretary of Defense shall conduct a pilot outreach program 
to reduce the demand for illegal drugs. The program shall include 
outreach activities by the active and reserve components of the 
Armed Forces and shall focus primarily on youths in general and 
inner-city youths in particular. (House Conference Report, 1992) 
The Department of the Navy responded with the Qrug and Education For Youth 
(DEFY) program. 
a. The Drug Education For Youth (DEFY) Program47 
The DEFY program is just one of several community awareness 
programs the Department of Navy (DoN) sponsors through the Secretary of the 
Navy's Drug Demand Reduction Task Force (DDRTF). 48 It is highlighted here 
as an example of how Navy drug prevention resources are used in programs 
outside the military arena. 
The DEFY program targets 9-12 year olds (typically inner-city 
youth) and provides education, skill-building and other positive work related 
experiences. Its stated goal is to "enhance drug resistance, goal-setting, 
leadership, self-esteem, conflict resolution, and fitness skills" (DDRTF brief, 
July 1994). DEFY is actually a two phase program. It combines an intensive 
five day residential summer camp (phase one) with a follow-up school 
mentoring program (phase two). Besides the one-on-one mentoring, the school 
program includes tutoring and special events. It is intended to reinforce the 
47Major portions of this section were obtained during an interview with Captain Ken White 
(USMC), SECNAV Drug Demand Reduction Task Force (DDTRF) Washington, DC, by the author 
on 08 August 1994. 
48Examples of other community outreach programs include: The Young Marines, The Naval Sea 
Cadet Corps, Campaign Drug Free/Navy Kids, and the Seaborne Conservation Corps (SCC). 
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role-modeling initiated in phase one. In FY-94, DEFY expanded from the 
original two sites (FY -93) to 28 sites (for a total of 35 programs). It reached 
communities in 18 states, enrolling over 1,500 young people (CHINFO MSG, 
1 994). The cost of DEFY will exceed one million dollars in FY -94 and is 
expected to increase to about $1.6 million in FY -95 (DCNO {N-515} CD 
spreadsheet, 1 994). 
Chapter Ill detailed the shift in the federal budget priorities toward 
prevention and treatment programs and showed a· 23 percent drop (from FY -93 
to FY-95) in total DoD counterdrug funding (see Table 3-1 ). The 
Administration's FY-95 budget for DoD shows a $13.2 million request for 
community outreach programs. 49 Over six million dollars of this request was 
for community programs targeting inner-city youth (all Services). While DoD 
and the military departments absorbed a $1 0 million cut in their overall 
prevention budgets, new community awareness prevention programs (e.g., 
DEFY) were being added for DoD sponsorship. 
Few will argue with the strategy of targeting youth in drug 
prevention models. The most important predictor of risk for drug abuse is the 
age an abuser initially uses drugs. Research has shown that when the use was 
initiated before the age of 15, there is a major risk of serious drug abuse later 
in life (Kandel, 1978, 1982; Kandel et al., 1986). Therefore, the most effective 
long-term prevention strategies point to programs like DEFY (intervention before 
abuse has started). 
However, the question becomes: "Is the Navy efficiently using its 
scarce drug abuse prevention dollars to combat internal drug abuse problems 
or are the funds being siphoned-off into programs unrelated to DoD's ov~rall 
mission?" Though not directly associated, it is ironic that the Navy's PREVENT 
49The total Federal Budget request for Community Awareness and education programs 
(including workplace programs) totals over $2 Billion for FY-95, a 32 percent increase over FY-93 
(NDCS, 1994). 
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program received a one million dollar cut in FY -94 while the Navy increased its 
spending on the DEFY program by roughly the same amount. 
The shift in resources from "pure" DoD mission related functions 
to programs considered non-defense is a political problem which has recently 
received more attention. The Congressional Research Service reported the 
following: 
... as the defense budget is going down, the share that is non-
defense is {going} up ... about $3.1 billion of the 1990 military 
budget went for non-defense programs. By 1 994, the diverted 
funds had increased to $12.7 billion. (Congressional Research 
Service, 1994) 
Some of the "non-defense" related programs the Congressional Research 
Service highlights include: 
• Breast cancer research 
• The Summer and Special Olympics 
• Foreign aid 
• Civilian youth programs 
Senator Daniel R. Coats (R-Indiana) was questioned about the 
apparent flow of funds from defense to non-defense programs, and specifically 
about DoD sponsored inner-city drug abuse programs (like DEFY). 50 The 
Senator responded that the Senate Armed Services Committee was very 
concerned about this issue, but . that they also recognized the unique 
opportunities/abilities that military personnel possess. Rather than cut-off good 
programs, Senator Coats suggested that those federal agencies benefiting from 
50 Senator Coats addressed the student body at The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 
on 28 October 1994. He serves on the Senate Armed Services Committee and is also an influential 
member of The Subcommittee on Children, Family, Drugs and Alcoholism. 
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defense personnel (and other DoD assets) should be required to fund the special 
programs (i.e., reimburse DoD for the cost of the programs). 
The requested DoD drug prevention budget totals only $79.9 
million in FY-95 (which includes funding for drug testing), and represents a 
decrease of $10 million (FY -93 to FY -95); conversely, the Department of 
Education's (DoE) drug prevention budget increased by over $173.4 million 
(NDCS, 1994). 51 One questions why non-defense programs like DEFY are not 
funded from DoE's resources? 
B. PERSONNEL EFFICIENCY AND EFFECTIVENESS IN DRUG PREVENTION 
Personnel efficiency and effectiveness are discussed together in this 
section for reasons of continuity. Personnel efficiency relates to how well one 
is maximizing efficiency in using the "scarce resource" of human labor. When 
discussing this in relation to drug abuse prevention programs, one must 
consider who to assign the NADAP program responsibilities at the command 
level (i.e., the DAPA). The goal is to increase the efficiency of the command's 
labor while increasing the effectiveness of the program. 
1 . The Command DAPA 
The duties, responsibilities, and requirements of the command DAPA are 
outlined in Chapter Ill. OPNAVINST 5350.48 recommends that the DAPA be 
a "top-performing volunteer" who is a mature individual (E-6 or above) with 
credibility at every level within the command. The DAPA job is a collateral duty 
assignment in units having less than 1 ,000 people. Therefore, in the maj_ority 
51 The DOE's FY-95 total prevention request totals over $782 million. The $173.4 million net 
increase is over the FY -94 appropriation. A break-out of the increase shows: ( 1) $110.5 million 
increase for Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities State Grants; (2) an $80 million increase 
for Safe Schools; and (3) a $0.5 million increase for program administration (NDCS, 1994, p. 30). 
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of the Navy's command's, the DAPA's duties must be completed after the 
"normal" job requirements are fulfilled. There are several inefficiencies in 
managing the DAPA program which reduces the over-all effectiveness of drug 
prevention at the command level. These include: 
• Billet assignments and the DAPA 
• Volunteers for DAPA 
• Abundance of Special Programs and Training Requirements 
a. Billet Assignments and The DAPA 
When SUPERS assigns personnel to commands, the DAPA 
qualification is not considered. Therefore, a command often must "grow its 
own" DAPA by sending the individual to school.52 Since the DAPA course 
teaches just the very basics in substance abuse prevention, practical experience 
is important for building a successful program. When an individual rotates from 
the command, the detailer does not consider the previous DAPA assignment 
(even if it was a primary duty). As a result, some command's may end up 
without any personnel trained or experienced in DAPA responsibilities; 
another's may have several individuals with extensive DAPA experience. 
Efficiency is lost since the Navy does not optimize its labor force by logically 
assigning its personnel based on DAPA expertise. 
b. Volunteers for DAPA 
The ambition of the NADAP is for the command's best personnel 
to strive to be the DAPA. Unfortunately, the reality is often quite differ~nt. 
This study found (through various interviews and the author's own experience) 
52The DAP A course is a five day training program which teaches the basics on running a 
command level drug and alcohol program (such as filling out reports and setting-up aftercare 
appointments). 
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that the DAPA is often relegated to the senior enlisted "forced-volunteer" who 
probably will not make the next grade level, or a junior officer (usually with less 
than four years of active duty). The "top performing," highly motivated, self-
starter that OPNAVINST 5350.48 envisions volunteering for the DAPA 
assignment is also a dynamic leading petty officer, shop supervisor, or 
promising division chief who is striving for "operational" type collateral duties 
vice "soft" programs like DAPA. 53 Simply put, the DAPA is usually not a high 
profile collateral duty eagerly sought after by command personnel. This results 
in a drug prevention program which may suffer in effectiveness (less motivated 
individuals running the program). 
c. Abundance of Special Programs and Training Requirements 
A chief complaint in the fleet today are the numerous mandated 
"extra" programs and training requirements. From aggressive General Military 
Training (GMT) guidelines to "HIV/AIDS" awareness, sexual harassment and 
"Lower Back Injury" prevention, the command inspection guidelines continue 
to expand on programs and training which units are required to complete. With 
the increasing number of programs and training, the tendency is for commands 
to just "check the block." In other words, go through the motions of meeting 
the minimum training requirements without consideration for effectiveness. 
The drug and alcohol programs within the command can become viewed as 
simply one more requirement to complete. This tends to severely decrease 
effectiveness. 
The efficiency problem arises from the segmented way many of 
these requirements are fulfilled. The individual is once again fragmented .into 
many different behavioral type high-risk components. Rather than grouping the 
53There is at least one situation where the command DAPA was a "recovering alcoholic" who 
had not quite recovered. The commanding officer did not trust the individual to work on the 
squadron aircraft, so he was assigned several "special" type programs, including DAPA. 
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high-risk behaviors together (like alcohol abuse, tobacco cessation, HIV I AIDS, 
sexual assault, and suicide), these behaviors are split apart with different 
command personnel being responsible for each piece. Certainly some 
economies of scale exist in having one highly trained individual specialize in 
"wellness" or "special training" type programs to achieve some of the "overlap 
phenomenon" discussed earlier in this thesis. 
2. Training and Special Program Professional 
During an interview with a former Navy Director of Budget and Reports 
(NCB/N-82) the question was posed whether the Navy had ever considered 
creating a "Training Specialist" or "Special Program Professional" billet at the 
command level to effectively and efficiently carry out the many additional 
collateral training responsibilities a command must fulfill (specifically referring 
to the drug and alcohol programs). 54 The retired rear admiral stated that the 
idea had been considered during the ZBT&ER deliberations. He personally 
supported the proposal, but no movement had been made on the issue 
(Interview with Milligan, 1994). 
The Secretary of the Navy recently approved creating the Special Duty 
Officer (Fleet Support) Community. The CNO has directed shifting the General 
Unrestricted Line (GEN URL) community to fulfill the Fleet Support mission, 
changing the GEN URL from an 11 OX designation to a staff (restricted line 
community) designation of 170X (CNO MSG, 1994). One of the career paths 
being built into the fleet support competitive categories is in Manpower, 
Personnel, and Training (MPT). Serious consideration should be given to 
creating a "Special Program Training" billet within each command and assigping 
the MPT specialists (170X) these "special program" duties (including the DAPA 
5
.,_he Director of Budget and Reports (NCB) prepares and administers the Department of Navy 
Budget for SECNAV. NCB is "double-hatted," working also for the CNO as The Director of the 
Fiscal Management Division (N-82). 
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responsibilities). Efficiencies would be created as detailers could match 
individual's experience and expertise to specific billets. Additionally, the 
Training Specialists could efficiently group the various command programs 
together, creating an increasingly effective and comprehensive approach to 
substance abuse and the many other behavioral oriented programs existing in 
the Navy today. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has considered the primary research question: What is the 
most effective and efficient method to prevent drug abuse in the Navy? Three 
subsidiary questions were addressed to answer this question: 
• Is drug testing an effective method for preventing drug abuse? 
• What is the best model for preventing drug abuse? 
• Does the Navy efficiently utilize its resources in fighting drug abuse? 
1. Drug Testing as an Effective Method for Preventing Drug Abuse 
Without question, urinalysis has proven to be an effective drug abuse 
prevention method in the Navy. However, its level of effectiveness depends 
on at least four prerequisites: 
• Randomness of the drug test (using the constant model) 
• A clear statement of consequences 
• Command level implementation 
• Reliability /believability of the drug test 
While drug testing has shown to be effective, the importance of other 
prevention and intervention programs cannot be discounted. This is particularly 
important when considering the risk of substitute substances and other high-
risk behaviors. 
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2. The Best Model for Preventing Drug Abuse 
The cognitive/lifestyle model of drug abuse prevention appears to be the 
best model for prevention and intervention. The multi-modality approach that 
researchers recommend addresses behavior change, creating an overlap 
phenomena of prevention. The Navy's PREVENT program uses this 
cognitive/lifestyle model in its Level I intervention and prevention course. 
The Air Force also has shown effective prevention efforts in preventing 
drug abuse. Their success appears to be linked to the following elements: 
• Historically tighter drug abuse policy 
• Quality of recruit/psychological profile 
• Proactive law enforcement 
• Quality of life 
3. The Efficient Utilization of Resources 
The utilization of resources was considered from two different levels and 
perspectives: 
• Program funding and management responsibilities 
• Efficiency and effectiveness at the command level 
a. The Flow of Program Funds and Management Responsibilities 
Of all the drug prevention programs, the Navy gives drug testing 
the "highest priority." The PREVENT program's efficiency and effectiveness 
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suffers primarily due to the inefficient way the Navy services the PREVENT 
contract. These inefficiencies include: 
• Multiple resource providers 
• A flexible budget which cannot compete with the higher priority 
funding for drug testing 
• A separation between drug prevention funding and other "wellness" 
programs (i.e., fragmented budgets addressing holistic type behavioral 
problems) 
Additionally, the resource sponsorship, major claimancy, and 
program manager functions appear to be spread between too many Navy 
departments. This creates redundancy, "lack of ownership," and other 
efficiency related problems. 
b. Efficiency and Effectiveness at the Command Level 
Both the efficiency and effectiveness of the command level drug 
prevention program (managed by the DAPA) appears questionable due to the 
following factors: 
• Personnel with prior DAPA training or experience are not tracked at 
the SUPERS level. Therefore, assignment to specific command level 
billets is not possible. 
• "Volunteers" for DAPA may not be "top performing" individuals. As 
a collateral duty, the DAPA responsibility might not be considered a 
premiere, front running assignment. 
• · The abundance of special programs and training requirements 




Based on the analysis conducted in this thesis and the conclusions 
reached in the prior section, four primary recommendations are offered for 
consideration: 
• Maintain a sound and proactive PREVENT program 
• Consolidate wellness type program responsibilities 
• Continue the current drug testing program with a focus on ways to 
increase command level implementation 
• Provide strong, top-level support for the drug abuse prevention budget 
1 . Maintain a Sound and Proactive Prevent Program55 
PREVENT is an excellent model of drug abuse prevention. Unfortunately, 
even as the demand for PREVENT exceeds the supply, resources continue to 
decline. The PREVENT program is in jeopardy of being significantly altered due 
primarily to financial constraints. 
The current PREVENT contract expires at the end of FY -95. The Navy 
has an opportunity to review the contract and request changes to strengthen 
and increase the PREVENT program's effectiveness and efficiency. 
2. Consolidation of Wellness Type Program Responsibilities 
All wellness and health promotion type programs (including drug and 
alcohol programs) should be consolidate under the same chain-of-command for 
resource sponsorship, major claimancy, and program management functic:ms. 
55This is the second thesis completed in the past twelve months which has independently 
come to the same primary recommendation (to maintain or expand the PREVENT program). See 
Lewis, S.W., A Cost Analysis of a Navy Drug Abuse Education Program, Naval Postgraduate School 
thesis, Monterey, CA, December 1993. 
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This recommendation concurs with the ZBT&ER recommendation, suggesting 
the programs be grouped under the sole resource sponsorship of N-7 (Director 
of Naval Training), with CNET acting as the major claimant and program 
manger. 
3. Continue Current Drug Testing: Focus on Command Implementation 
The Navy should continue its proven drug testing program and focus on 
command level drug prevention implementation in the following areas: 
• Consider creating a Training Specialists career path at the command 
level who would assume the DAPA duties and responsibilities as one 
of their primary tasks. The newly created Special Duty Officer (Fleet 
Support) Community (170X) appears to be ideally suited for this role. 
• Continue to support efforts increasing believability/reliability of the 
drug testing program. 
• At the Recruit Training Command, the Navy should continue its use 
of the N-AFMET psychological screening process to attrite undesirable 
personnel (especially those with substance abuse problems). 
4. Strongly Defend the Navy's Drug Abuse Prevention Budget 
As DoD's and the Navy's counterdrug dollars decrease, a strong defense 
should be made to maintain the Navy's internal drug prevention programs (both 
drug testing and drug prevention/education). Specifically, the Department of 
Defense should argue against funding non-defense related programs from DoD 
budgets. 
1 1 1 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. Target Drug Testing Based on Age 
The overwhelming majority of drug abusers in the Navy are under 26 
years of age (over 80 percent). Creating a random urinalysis test model which 
biased the probability of being tested toward the younger generation could 
increase detection/deterrence and save resources. 
2. Expanding the PREVENT Program 
The influence of the military on young enlistees as they transition to 
adulthood is significant. Research points to this transition period (between the 
ages of 1 8-21 ) as one of "great plasticity," with significant impacts on both the 
personality and the social perspective of the young adult (Lieblich, 1989). 
PREVENT, as a "cognitive/lifestyle" behavioral change model, provides 
exceptional resources to the young enlisted recruit and can have a positive 
affect on this "transition to adulthood." Therefore, further study should 
consider incorporating PREVENT into a core requirement for advancement to 
third class petty officer, ensuring all sailors have the benefit of this excellent 
program. Additionally, further study should consider the applicability of 
including a PREVENT module for basic training or "A" school graduates. 
3. Developing Effective Strategies for the DPAS/DIPM Program 
The Drug Policy Analysis System (DPAS) and the Drug Information 
Presentation Model (DIPM) programs offer a valuable tool in developing 
effective strategies for implementing a more efficient drug testing program. 
Further research is needed to evaluate the best way to utilize these new 
powerful information systems. 
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